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Since the late 1980s, commercial whaling has not been permitted under
the terms of what is commonly known as a "moratorium" adopted by the In-
ternational Whaling Commission (the "IWC" or the "Commission"). None-
theless, during this period Japan has conducted a whale research program
that has involved the limited, lethal taking of the stocks being studied. It has
done so acting pursuant to the terms of Article VIII of the International Con-
vention for the Regulation of Whaling? Article VIII expressly authorizes
member governments to issue permits to take whales for scientific research
purposes, "[n]otwithstanding anything contained in this Convention," and it
requires the utilization of meat and other by-products of research "so far as
practicable."2
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1. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, art. VIII,
T.I.A.S. No. 1849, 161 U.N.T.S. 72 entered into force Nov. 10, 1948) [hereinafter ICRW or
Convention].
2. Article VIII of the Convention is discussed in detail infra Section I.A.
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Japan's program has been attacked both by other governments and by
non-governmental organizations as illegitimate science, as a "cover" for
commercial whaling, and as inconsistent with Japan's obligations under the
Convention and international law in general. As the result of Japan's pursuit
of this program, on three occasions-in 1988, 1995, and 2000-Japan has
been formally "certified" by the United States under the U.S. Pelly Amend-
ment' for taking actions that "diminish the effectiveness" of the 1WC.' In
connection with the most recent certification of Japan on September 13,
2000, resulting from the expansion of Japan's research program in the North
Pacific, then-Secretary of Commerce Norman Mineta claimed that "Japan
has no reasonable scientific justification for its whaling efforts."' In an Op-
Ed appearing in the Washington Post on August 27, 2000, Secretary Mineta
declared, "The Japanese argument that all of these whales must be killed in
order to collect certain scientific data is preposterous." 6 Perhaps not surpris-
ingly in light of such declarations, at least one legal commentator has urged
the position that, despite the terms of Article VIII of the Convention, the
Japanese research program constitutes an "abuse of right" under interna-
tional law.7
Is the Japanese whale research program indeed beyond the pale of sci-
ence and the law as some assert? This article suggests that the case against
Japan, far from being firmly grounded upon a fair and impartial assessment
of the program's scientific worth and international legal principles, rests
upon a series of fundamentally flawed premises. As discussed in Section I,
the Japanese program does not flout the Convention's rules. Rather, the pro-
gram has been pursued in a manner consistent with the structure, purpose,
and letter of the Convention. Further, while Japan has not always followed
recommendations made by the parties to the ICRW, it has scrupulously ad-
hered to all binding rules established by the 1WC, including the moratorium
on commercial whaling adopted in 1982 and the creation of a Southern
3. Fisherman's Protective Act of 1967 § 8, 22 U.S.C. § 1978 *2001) [hereinafter Pelly
Amendment].
4. The Pelly Amendment authorizes the President of the United States to prohibit impor-
tation of products from countries that allow a) fishing operations that diminish the effective-
ness of an international fishery conservation program, or (b) trade or taking that diminishes
the effectiveness of an international program for endangered or threatened species. Id. Al-
though the Secretary of Commerce has certified Japan on three occasions since 1988, the
President imposing trade sanctions is discretionary, and on each occasion, the President has
declined to impose sanctions. For the most recent presidential determination on this subject,
see Letter from William J. Clinton, President, to Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the U.S. House of
Representatives (Dec. 29, 2000), at http://www.noaa.gov/whales/clinton-whaledecision.htm
(last visited March 29, 2001).
5. White House Press Briefing on U.S. Actions on Japanese Whaling (Sept. 13, 2000) at
http://www.noaa.gov/whaleslbriefing.htm (last visited March 29, 2001).
6. Norman Y. Mineta, Stop Japan's Whale Killing, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 2000, at B7,
available at LEXIS, Nexis Library Wash. Post File.
7. Gillian Triggs, Japanese Scientific Whaling: An Abuse of Right or Optimal Utiliza-
tion?, 5 AsiA PAC. J. ENvTL. L. 33 (2000).
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Ocean Sanctuary (the "SOS") for whale protection in 1994. Contrary to Sec-
retary Mineta's claim that any scientific justification for the program is
"preposterous," the program has been recognized by the IWC's Scientific
Committee, the primary scientific organ of the Commission, as making im-
portant contributions to the understanding of whale biology and as beidg
relevant to management concerns that are at the core of the IWC's mission
All of Japan's research activities have been implemented with due regard to
ensuring that any biological impact on the stocks would be de minimis, and
the program thus poses scant risks to whale populations.
Sections ll-IV of this article suggest that the case against Japan pursuant
to principles of international law is notable for its weakness. "Abuse of
right" is a legal doctrine of uncertain contours and application.9 It is far from
clear, based on a review of traditional sources of international law such as
municipal law, the writings of scholars, and the rulings of international tri-
bunals, that the abuse of right doctrine has sufficiently evolved from a policy
abstraction to .a concrete rule of decision or juridical standard that limits
State prerogatives. Moreover, despite some suggestions to the contrary, nei-
ther the 1998 decision of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organiza-
tion ("WTO") in the so-called "Shrimp Case,"'" nor the 1999 decision on
provisional remedies of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
("ITLOS") in the "Southern Bluefin Tuna Case,"" supports an expansive in-
terpretation of the abuse of right doctrine. 2 Rather, both cases turn on the
specific standards set out in the agreements under review, and neither stands
for the proposition that there is a general principle of abuse of right in inter-
national law on which the tribunal relied. In light of the uncertainty sur-
rounding the principle, Japan cannot be expected to know the nature of the
prohibited conduct and to be held responsible for engaging in it.
Finally, as discussed in Section V, even if the principle exists as a con-
crete and intelligible principle of international law, it is still difficult, given
what we know about the Japanese research program, to make a credible
claim that the program reflects abuse of rights guaranteed to Japan under the
Convention.
8. Report of the Scientific Committee, I.W.C. Scientific Committee at 63, I.W.C. Doc.
IWC/49l4 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 SC Report].
9. There is a disagreement among scholars whether "abuse of right" is the same as or dif-
ferent from a breach of "a duty of good faith." See infra note 156. For convenience this article
will use the term "abuse of right" broadly to include both principles.
10. United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of
the Appellate Body, W.T.O. Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), at http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop-e/dispu-e/58abr.pdf [hereinafter Shrimp Case].
11. Southern Bluefin Tuna Case (N.Z. v. Japan; Austl. v. Japan), 1999 ITLOS Nos. 3 &
4 (Provisional Measures Order of Aug. 27), at http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html [hereinafter
Southern Bluefin Tuna Case].
12. With respect to the Southern Bluefin Tuna Case, subsequent to the ITLOS decision
on provisional remedies, the Arbitral Panel, on August 4, 2000, reversed the ITLOS decision,
finding that the Tribunal was without jurisdiction. See infra Section IV. The ITLOS decision
is thus of little precedential significance today.
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Despite the political criticism heaped on Japan for the continuation of
its research activities, the program falls well within the parameters of legiti-
mate scientific research that is permissible, in the sole discretion of the con-
tracting party, under the terms of the ICRW. Dr. Ray Gambell, the longtime,
well-respected Secretary of the IWC, stated in an interview on BBC News
Online, on July 5, 2000:
When the 1946 Convention under which we operate was signed, one of
the major articles introduced by the USA was the provision for a govern-
ment to be able to issue permits for research purposes. That has always
been in the Convention and many governments over the years have caught
quite large numbers of whales for research purposes but associated with
that provision is whales are too valuable just to catch, measure and throw
away. If you catch whales for research purposes, the requirement is that
they are fully utilized and the products disposed of in a way that the gov-
ernment decides. In other words, the products have to be fully utilized and
Japan is doing what every other government has done in previous years.
It's using whales for research, getting the research results which are sent
to the Scientific Committee of the IWC and it's putting the products into
the market place. 3
Dr. Gambell noted that the Japanese program in the Antarctic was
"working out a number of the aspects of the life of the whale which can be
used for management purposes" and that the Japanese North Pacific program
was aimed at elucidating stock structure, "an especially important item."' 4
Dr. Gambell then went on to observe, "Japan is not doing anything illegal by
catching the whales that it does and it is acting legally within the terms of
the Convention that we operate."" Dr. Gambell's observations should stand
as a caution to those who would cavalierly challenge the scientific and legal
bonafides of the Japanese research effort.
I. THE ICRW AND THE JAPANESE PROGRAM OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
A. The ICRW Regime for Scientific Research
The Japanese research program takes place in the context of the rights
and responsibilities established by the Convention. The Convention estab-
lishes the legal framework within which the program must be judged. Be-
cause claims of illegality may be loosely made, it is important at the outset
of this article to underscore how the Japanese program conforms to the pur-
poses and strictures of the Convention.
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Our analysis begins with the purposes of the Convention. These pur-
poses are significant in the context of this treaty. The ICRW is not a docu-
ment whose sole, or even primary, goal is protection of whale stocks. As
stated in its Preamble, the Convention has as its basic purpose "properly
regulated"1 whaling to achieve "the optimal level of whale stocks"'7 so as to
"permit increases in the numbers of whales which may be captured without
endangering these natural resources"'" and in order to "make possible the or-
derly development of the whaling industry."' 9 In fact, the Preamble, while
calling for achievement of optimal population levels, balances this goal
against the need to avoid "causing widespread economic and nutritional
stress." 0 In addition, the Preamble refers to the "development"'" as well as
the "conservation"22 of whale stocks, presumably reflecting the intent that
they be developed for harvesting. In the words of one commentator, "The
underlying assumption of the Whaling Convention is thus that, with proper
conservation measures, the whaling industry will continue. Nowhere in the
Convention is it envisaged that conservation might include a permanent ban
on whaling for reasons other than a scientifically demonstrated threat to
stocks or species." 3 Even ardent conservationists have acknowledged that
"the ultimate aim [of the Convention] is to develop the industry."24
Over the past twenty years, the Commission has amended the Schedule
to the Convention to adopt two management measures that have significantly
limited "development" as contemplated by the treaty parties in 1946. First,
in 1982, the IWC adopted a moratorium on commercial whaling, setting
catch limits at zero for the indefinite future, commencing in the 1985/86 pe-
lagic season. The moratorium is embodied in Paragraph 10(e) of the Sched-
ule. Second, in 1994, the IWC again amended the Schedule to create the
SOS. The SOS is embodied in Paragraph 7(b) of the Schedule.' Although
16, ICRW, supra note 1, pmbl., % 4.
17. Id. pmbl., 5.
18. Id. pmbl., 4.
19. Id. pmbl., 1 8. The basic draft for the Convention presented by the United States
would have stated that the purpose of the treaty was "to provide for the orderly conservation
and development of whale fisheries." I.W.C. Doc. IWC/8 (1946).
20. ICRW, supra note 1, pmbl., 5.
21. Id. pmbl., 4.
22. Id.
23. Triggs, supra note 7, at 47. These purposes, it should be noted, are reinforced by Ar-
ticle V of the Convention, which authorizes the treaty parties to adopt binding management
measures to be embodied in the "Schedule" to the Convention. Article V specifies that these
measures "shall be such as are necessary to carry out the objectives and purposes of this Con-
vention and to provide for the conservation, development, and optimum utilization of whale
resources." ICRW, supra note 1, art. V, 2. Necessarily this envisages a consumption- and
harvest-oriented regime.
24. 1 PATRICIA BIRNm, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF WHALING: FROM CONSERVATION
OF WHALING TO CONSERVATION OF WHALES AND REGULATION OF WHALE-WATCHING 172
(1985).
25. The IWC in 1979 also created an Indian Ocean Sanctuary. See ICRW, supra note 1,
Schedule, I 7(a) (amended 1999).
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the moratorium is binding as a matter of international law on Japan, this is
not true of the SOS.26 Japan lodged a formal objection to the SOS with re-
spect to Antarctic minke whales on August 12, 1994, and since that objec-
tion remains in effect, Japan under the ICRW is not legally bound by the
relevant terms of the SOS. It is not the purpose of this article to discuss
whether these measures are or are not consistent with the Convention." As-
suming their validity, it is our purpose to show despite claims to the con-
trary, it is consistent with the terms of either for Japan to pursue its research
activities in the Antarctic or the North Pacific, even if that research is aimed
at providing a predicate for the resumption of commercial whaling in areas
today designated as "sanctuaries."
Japan's research initiatives have sometimes been challenged as
inconsistent with the moratorium. Thus, former Secretary of Commerce
Mineta, in his August 27, 2000 Op-Ed piece in the Washington Post stated:
"We are concerned that the expansion of the Japanese hunt to larger whales
is aimed at paving the way for an outright resumption of commercial
whaling."2 However, Paragraph 10(e) of the Schedule in no way precludes
continued research, and, even if the purpose of the research were to "pave
the way" for renewed commercial whaling, this would be perfectly
consistent with the moratorium. Paragraph 10(e) of the Schedule makes it
clear that the moratorium is specifically subject to "review based upon the
best scientific advice." '29 It contemplates a "comprehensive assessment of the
effects" of the moratorium will be undertaken and acknowledges commercial
whaling might be resumed when stock reassessments "indicated sustained
catches by 1990.""o As the author of a leading treatise on the ICRW notes,
"the Schedule amendment establishing [the moratorium] did not rule out the
possibility of resumption of commercial whaling at some future date and
provided a review within at least four years."31 Plainly research focused upon
establishing a scientific basis for the Commission again to set harvest quotas
is entirely consistent with the terms of the moratorium.
By the same token, the establishment of the SOS scarcely rules out the
appropriateness of research in the Antarctic. Groups like Greenpeace have
26. Japan initially objected to the moratorium, but it subsequently withdrew that objec-
tion and so is subject to this measure. ICRW, supra note 1, art. V, 3. See Japan Whaling
Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 227-28, 227 n.1 (1986).
27. It has been argued, in particular, that the SOS is not justified under the Convention.
See William T. Burke, Memorandum of Opinion on the Legality of the Designation of the
Southern Ocean Sanctuary by the IWC, 27 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 315 (1996); William T.
Burke, Legal Aspects of the IWC Decision on the Southern Ocean Sanctuary, 28 OCEAN DEv.
& INT'L L. 313 (1997). But see Patricia Bimie, Opinion on the Legality of the Designation of
the Southern Ocean Whale Sanctuary by the International Whaling Commission, Agenda Item
13, I.W.C. Doc. IWC/47/41 (1995).
28. Mineta, supra note 6.
29. ICRW, supra note 1, Schedule, 10(e) (amended 1999).
30. Id.
31. 2 BiRNIE, supra note 24, at 655.
[Vol. 32
6
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 32, No. 2 [2002], Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol32/iss2/2
2002] JAPAN'S WHALE RESEARCH PROGRAM AND INT'L LAW 157
argued that "[i]n 1994 the entire Southern Ocean was designated a whale
sanctuary so [sic] prohibiting the killing of whales for commercial purposes
in the area (regardless of their population status)--there is no possible need
for the Japanese data."3 Likewise, in announcing his decision following the
certification of Japan under the Pelly Amendment in September 2000, Presi-
dent Clinton stated:
I also remain concerned about Japan's practice of taking whales in the
Southern Ocean Sanctuary north of Antarctica. This is an internationally
recognized sanctuary that was approved by the IWC. I see no justification
for Japan's practice and will continue to urge Japan to reconsider its pol-
icy, which I believe undermines the effectiveness of whale sanctuaries
everywhere.33
Such statements ignore the terms of the sanctuary designation. Under
Paragraph 7(b) of the Schedule, the SOS is not permanent. It is to be re-
viewed by the IWC "ten years after its initial adoption," in 2004, and there-
after at ten-year intervals.' Moreover, by its terms, it in no way prohibits re-
search, including lethal taking, in the Southern Ocean.35 Even skeptics of the
Japanese program must acknowledge that, "Japan is... not prohibited from
taking minke whales within the SOS, if whaling is under a special permit for
scientific purposes."36 Arguably such research is necessary to allow the
Commission to make a decision in 2004 based on the best available science
and consistent with the Convention's objectives of achieving the twin goals
of conservation and utilization of whale resources.
It is equally clear that Japan's decision not to follow various resolutions
of the IWC requesting it to "refrain" from research activities does not put it
in violation of its treaty obligations.37 Groups like Greenpeace have repeat-
edly emphasized that "Japan has continuously ignored the numerous resolu-
tions adopted by the IWC calling for Japan to cease its 'scientific' whal-
32. Greenpeace, Japan's "Scientific" Whaling (July 2000), at http://www. green-
peace.org/-oceans/whaling/japanesewhaling~scientific.html.
33. Letter from William J. Clinton, President, to Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the U.S.
House of Representatives (Dec. 29, 2000), at http://www.noaa.gov/whales/clinton-
whaledecision.htm (last visited March 29, 2001).
34. ICRW, supra note 1, Schedule, I 7(b) (amended 1999).
35. "The Commission has a major research initiative in the Antarctic (SOWER-
Southern Ocean Whale and Ecosystem Research Programme) with two main components, one
concerning the abundance estimation of minke whales and other baleen whales south of 60'S,
and the second concerning the status of Southern Hemisphere blue whales." Gregory P.
Donovan, First Editorial, 1 J. CETACEAN REs. & MGMT. at ii (1999), available at
http://www.ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/iwcoffice/Editorial.html. In 1998, the
Commission affirmed that it was consistent with the sanctuary designation to undertake re-
search on the status of the stocks and "the effects of environmental change on whale stocks."
Id.
36. Triggs, supra note 7, at 52.
37. See infra Section I.C.
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ing."38 The United States has also stressed the IWC resolutions in making
Pelly Amendment certifications. 39 It is suggested that "non-compliance" with
IWC resolutions indicates that Japan is flouting the will of the IWC. Article
VI of the Convention, however, which authorizes the Commission to adopt
resolutions, makes it clear that such resolutions make "recommendations"
only.' They are not binding on member states."' In connection with its Scien-
tific Research program, Japan has been scrupulous in complying with all its
legal obligations under Paragraph 30 of the Schedule."2 That it may choose
not to comply with each and every Commission recommendation is plainly
its legal prerogative.
Japan's freedom under the Convention to issue research permits and
pursue scientific studies of whales as it deems fit, whatever the resolutions
of the IWC may recommend, is underscored by Article VIII of the Conven-
tion, which deals directly with the issue of scientific research. While Profes-
sor Bimie has referred to Article VIII as "exempting from the regulations of
the lWC whales taken and treated under scientific permits," 3 and while Arti-
cle VIII does contain the term "exempt," the Article is far broader than a
mere exemption or exception from the IWC's rules. Article VIII, confirming
the presumably pre-existing powers of treaty parties to conduct research,
recognizes their absolute, sovereign right to issue permits for scientific re-
search in their sole discretion. Article VIII, paragraph 1, provides:
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Convention, any Contracting
Government may grant to any of its nationals a special permit authorizing
that national to kill, take, and treat whales for purposes of scientific re-
search subject to such restrictions as to number and subject to such other
conditions as the Contracting Government thinks fit, and the killing, tak-
ing, and treating of whales in accordance with the provisions of this Arti-
cle shall be exempt from the operation of this Convention.
44
It is hard to imagine a broader statement of the treaty parties' ability to
carry out certain activities by national decision. Article VIII provides no cri-
38. Greenpeace, supra note 32, at http://www.greenpeace.org/-oceans/whaling/ japane-
sewhaling~scientific.html.
39. See Letter from Norman Y. Mineta, Secretary of Commerce, to William I. Clinton,
President (Sept. 13, 2000), at http://www.noaa.gov/whales/minetaletter.htm [hereinafter Let-
ter from Mineta].
40. ICRW, supra note 1, art. VI.
41. See 1 BHRNiE, supra note 24, at 189. Recommendations stand in contrast to Schedule
Amendments, which are adopted pursuant to Article V of the Convention. ICRW, supra note
1, art. V. Schedule Amendments require a three-quarters majority for adoption. ICRW, supra
note 1, art. III, 2. In addition, Schedule Amendments must be "based on scientific findings,"
and an elaborate procedure allows member states to "object" to such Amendments and so
avoid their effect. ICRW, supra note 1, art. V, 3.
42. See infra Section I.B.
43. 1 BmINI, supra note 24, at 190.
44. ICRW, supra note 1, art. VIII.
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teria, standards, or other guidance for the conduct of "scientific research.""5
It is up to the particular nation to decide what projects it should pursue.
While Article VIII, paragraph 1, requires the parties to "report" to the Com-
mission all authorizations which they may grant,' it is clear that there is no
requirement for prior approval from the Commission. 7 In short "[t]he discre-
tionary power is undeniably broad,"4 and the issuance of scientific permits
represents the exercise of "sovereign authority."49
Japan's exercise of its authority under Article VIII has not been excep-
tional or unique. "[P]rior to 1982, over 100 permits had been issued by a
number of governments including Canada, USA, USSR, South Africa and
Japan."' Since institution of the moratorium, Norway and Iceland, in addi-
tion to Japan, have issued scientific permits."
In exercising its rights under Article VIII, Japan has been particularly
attacked for selling whale meat from animals taken for research purposes. In
his letter of certification under the Pelly Amendment, Secretary Mineta
stressed that "[p]roducts of the research harvest are sold in Japanese mar-
kets,"52 and, in his August 27, 2000 Washington Post Op-Ed, he termed this
an "alarming factor."53 Greenpeace, not surprisingly, has chosen to make the
same point, stating, "The fact that all the whale meat from Japan's so-called
'scientific' whaling is destined for the domestic market makes obvious that it
is primarily a commercial activity." It is understandable that those opposed
to whaling, especially for ethical reasons, are troubled by the.consumption of
whale products, whether derived from animals taken for research or other-
wise. However, Japan, in authorizing the sale of whale meat, is doing no
more than what the Convention requires. Article VIII, paragraph 2, of the
Convention provides, "Any whales taken under these special permits shall so
far as practicable be processed and the proceeds shall be dealt with in accor-
45. Triggs, supra note 7, at 51.
46. ICRW, supra note 1, art. VIII, 3. That paragraph also requires that research results
be submitted to "such body as may be designated by the Commission," viz., the Scientific
Committee. Id.
47. See 1 BiRN E, supra note 24, at 190. As Professor Birnie points out, "[s]uggestions
that the Commission should be consulted, not merely informed, about such permits were re-
jected." Id. at 190 n. 110. Although Paragraph 30 to the Schedule was adopted to require pro-
posed scientific permits be submitted to the Scientific Committee in advance of issuance,
"[t]he permits are still not, however, subject to prior approval by the SC, only to review and
comment." Id. at 190 n. 111 (emphasis in original).
48. Triggs, supra note 7, at 50-51.
49. Id. at 52.
50. Int'l Whaling Commission, The IWC, Scientific Pennits and Japan, at
http://www.iwcoffice.org/sciperms.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2001) [hereinafter IWC Scien-
tific Permits Page].
51. See id.
52. Letter from Mineta, supra note 39.
53. Mineta, supra note 6.
54. Greenpeace, supra note 32.
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dance with directions issued by the Government by which the permit was
granted."5
To comply with the Convention, Japan has no option but to utilize
("process") the whales taken. Secretary Mineta's professed shock that whale
meat is being sold in the Japanese market thus, has little credibility. The at-
tack on Japan's research program is ill-founded, especially because proceeds
from the sale funded further research. 6
Finally, despite the orientation of the Convention toward consumptive
uses of whales and its ratification of national sovereignty over research pro-
grams, some commentators, citing "State practice" and developments in the
Law of the Sea and elsewhere, have suggested that the Convention can and
should be interpreted as evolving into a more "protectionist" agreement,
premised upon the "precautionary principle," where even lethal research
might not be tolerated." These commentators have espoused a "dynamic"
approach to treaty interpretation. 8 Yet, even these advocates must concede
that the precautionary principle cannot transform the Convention into some-
thing its language does not permit. As Professor Triggs notes, a "dynamic"
approach must be "employed with restraint... so as [not] to subvert... [a
treaty's] clear words and objectives." '59 Or, as Professor Birnie notes:
[The Commission] can interpret the treaty broadly to achieve its general
purposes, e.g., of conservation and development of stocks. Although such
interpretation can be broad, it cannot be perverse, and must conform to the
objects and purposes of the convention and to the general rules of interna-
tional law concerning treaties. 60
The parties cannot by "interpretation" change the positive terms of the
ICRW.6' That can only be accomplished by formal amendment to the treaty.
Professor Burke stated, "Reinterpretation of an agreement which defeats the
major purpose of the parties, and substitutes a purpose not shared by all par-
ties and actively rejected by some, is not a permissible means of interpreta-
tion under contemporary international law."'6 National prerogatives with re-
55. ICRW, supra note 1, art. VIII, 2.
56. Institute of Cetacean Research, Questions and Answers: Japans Whale Research
Programs, at http://www.whalesci.org/Q&Ajapanswhaleresearchpro2.html.
57. See Triggs, supra note 7, at 50.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 2 BIRNIE, supra note 24, at 654.
61. Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1990) [hereinafter Vienna Conven-
tion], specifies that a "treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose."
62. William Burke, Memorandum of Opinion on the Legality of the Designation of the
Southern Ocean Sanctuary by the IWC, 27 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 315, 323 (1996) (citing
Michael Akehurst, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 204, 205 (6th ed.
1987)). See also William Burke, Legal Aspects of the IWC Decision on the Southern Ocean
10
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gard to research, and the obligation to utilize whales taken, are so integral to
the language and structure of the Convention that in no way can an interpre-
tation be countenanced that would outlaw or limit research, even though the
fundamental purpose of the research may be to "pave the way" for the re-
sumption of commercial whaling.
B. The Nature of the Japanese Research Program
Given the legal framework described above, any claim that a research
program is inconsistent with the Convention or constitutes an "abuse of
right" ratified and conferred by that treaty would be difficult to make. Based
upon the assumption "that Japanese whaling has not been undertaken for the
primary purpose of scientific research," at least one commentator has argued
that the "abuse of right" doctrine then becomes "relevant."63 However con-
venient that assumption may be for such an argument, it is not borne out by
the facts.
In 1982, the IWC adopted a moratorium that set commercial whaling
catch limits for the indefinite future at zero, commencing after 1986. ' How-
ever, the provision made it clear that the zero quota would be "kept under
review, based upon the best scientific advice," and that the Commission
would undertake a "comprehensive assessment of the effects of this decision
on whale stocks."' It was contemplated that whaling might be resumed
when the "comprehensive assessment" of the stocks indicated that sustained
harvests would be permissible."
The Japanese research program was created in direct response to the
moratorium. In effect, it was intended to provide the scientific basis for the
IWC to make precisely the decisions contemplated by the treaty parties
when they adopted the moratorium. That it may have been intended to gen-
erate data and information that might support the resumption of commercial
whaling should scarcely be remarkable or a matter for criticism or concern.
Japan was simply going about obtaining what the Commission said it
wanted: research results that would permit future management decisions to
be made.
Since its inception, the Japanese research program has been conducted
under the auspices of the Institute for Cetacean Research (the "ICR" or the
"Institute"). The Institute was formed in 1987 as a non-profit research foun-
dation.67 It is not a fishing or processing company. It is a scientific institu-
Sanctuary, 28 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 313, 317, 322-23 (1997) ("the evolutionary approach is
not an acceptable way to subject one party to an agreement to a new agreement against its
wishes").
63. See, e.g., Triggs, supra note 7, at 37.
64. ICRW, supra note 1, Schedule, I 10(e) (amended 1999).
65. Id.
66. See id.
67. See Institute of Cetacean Research, About ICR, at http://www.whalesci.org/
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tion, whose staff includes biologists and other professionals trained in fisher-
ies science and wildlife management. It is dedicated to a wide range of ceta-
cean research. Today, it is funded by an annual grant of approximately nine
million dollars from the Government of Japan, together with funds derived
from the sales of whale meat." In addition to providing papers for review by
the IWC, the ICR holds monthly workshops for whale population assess-
ment, fisheries population assessment and management meetings and other
meetings for the exchange of information on cetaceans.' The Japanese pro-
gram involves not just sampling (through lethal takes) but "sighting surveys,
photo identification, acoustic surveys and biopsy sampling."7
Throughout its history, the ICR has conducted all its activities in close
coordination with the IWC Scientific Committee, a body composed of scien-
tist members designated by each State's representative to the Commission.
Under the terms of Paragraph 30 of the Schedule to the Convention, the Sci-
entific Committee reviews and comments upon all scientific permits pro-
posed to be issued by member states, in advance of their actual issuance.7
The Scientific Committee also reviews the research results from activities
conducted under the permits. Article F of its Rules of Procedure specifies
that the Scientific Committee shall "review the scientific aspects of the pro-
posed research at its annual meeting," taking into account any "guidelines"
issued by the Commission.72 The Rules require that the:
proposed permits and supporting documents should include specifics as to
the objectives of the research, number, sex, size, and stock of animals to
be taken, opportunities for participation in the research by scientists of
other nations, and the possible effect on conservation of the stock resulting
from granting the permits.73
Preliminary results "should be made available for the next meeting of
the Scientific Committee as part of the national progress report or as a spe-
cial report, paper or series of papers." '74 While the Scientific Committee con-
ducts a detailed review, the Committee recognizes that "the ultimate respon-
sibility for [permit] issuance lies with the member nation."75
All proposed Japanese scientific permits have in fact been submitted in
advance to the Scientific Committee. Consistent with its Rules of Procedure,
the Scientific Committee "concentrates" on the following:
abouticr.html (last visited May 16, 2001)
68. See supra Section I.A. Japan is required under the terms of Article VIII of the Con-
vention to process and utilize meat from whales taken for scientific research purposes.
69. See About ICR, supra note 67.
70. Id.
71. ICRW, supra note 1, Schedule, 30 (amended 1999).
72. INT'L WHALING COMMISSION, CHARMAN'S REPORT OF THE 51ST ANNuAL MEETING
72, app. 13, arts. F.1, F.2 (1999) (Revised Rules of Procedure of the Scientific Committee).
73. Id. art. F.3.
74. Id. art. F.4.
75. IWC Scientific Permits Page, supra note 50.
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(1) whether the permit adequately specifies its aims, methodology and the
samples to be taken;
(2) whether the research is essential for rational management, the work of
the Scientific Committee or other critically important research needs;
(3) whether the methodology and sample size are likely to provide reliable
answers to the questions being asked;
(4) whether the questions can be answered using non-lethal means;
(5) whether the catches will have an adverse effect on the stock; and
(6) whether there is the gotential for scientists from other nations to join
the research programme.
More recently, the IWC has refined its guidance to two basic elements:
first, whether the research program is "required for the purposes of manage-
ment of the species or stock being researched," and, second, "whether the
information sought could be obtained by non-lethal means."7 With 120 sci-
entist members from many different nations, as can be expected, "the review
of any permits rarely result [sic] in unanimity. The published reports of the
Scientific Committee reflect the agreements and disagreements of the review
process.".
There can be little question that review of the Japanese program by the
Scientific Committee has been thorough and intensive. The Government of
Japan has been assiduous in submitting its proposals and research results to
the Committee. Over the past fourteen years, massive amounts of data and
information have been provided for scientific review, and the Scientific
Committee has commended Japan on both the quantity and quality of the re-
search undertaken.79 While there have often been vigorous debate and
strongly asserted views, both pro and con, about various aspects of the Japa-
nese program, few have ever suggested that there was no scientific value to
the work, and most have recognized the validity of the studies in question.
An examination of the IWC record, especially the deliberations of the Scien-
tific Committee over the past five years, demonstrates that the science is
grappling with important questions and the research is making real contribu-
tions to the IWC' s understanding of cetacean biology and the role of whales
in the ecosystem.
76. Id.
77. INT'L WHALING COMMISSION, CHAIRMAN'S REPORT OF THE 51ST ANNUAL MEETING
72 (1999), app. 3, I.W.C. Resolution 1999-2.
78. IWC Scientific Permits Page, supra note 50. See also Alexander Gillespie, Whaling
Under a Scientific Auspice: The Ethics of Scientific Research Whaling Operations, 3 J. INT'L
WILDLIFE L. & POL'Y 1, 39 (2000) (noting "persistent lack of agreement between the scien-
tists").
79. Institute of Cetacean Research, Questions and Answers: Japans Whale Research
Programs, at http://www.whalesci.org/Q&Ajapanswhaleresearchpro2.html.
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1. Antarctic Research-the JARPA Program
The initial, and still the major, component of the Japanese research ini-
tiative is its program for studies in the Antarctic, usually referred to as
"JARPA." JARPA began with two feasibility studies in 1987/88 and
1988/89. Following these feasibility studies, a full-scale, fourteen-year pro-
gram was launched. The stated objectives of the program are:
(1) estimation of biological parameters (especially the natural mortality
rate) to improve management;
(2) elucidation of stock structure to improve management;
(3) examine role of whales in the Antarctic ecosystem; and
(4) examine effect of environmental changes on cetaceans.80
The program has two components: "a sighting survey whose primary
purpose is the estimation of trends in abundance, and a sampling component
to allow biological parameter values to be estimated given also the abun-
dance information provided by the sighting survey."'" Japan originally
planned to issue permits authorizing the take of 825 minke whales per year
in connection with the sampling survey, but this number was subsequently
reduced to 300 following completion of the feasibility studies.82 In 1995/96,
another 100 minke whales were added to the sampling effort, so that the cur-
rent level of sampling is 400 animals (plus or minus 10%)-all minke
whales-annually.83 To conduct its research, Japan employs four vessels,
plus a mother ship. In keeping with the best tradition of open scientific re-
search, Japan has repeatedly emphasized that "[p]articipation by interna-
tional scientists is welcomed" in research activities.84 As of the half-way
point in the program in 1997, the program had produced 133 published and
unpublished papers, a number of which appeared in peer-reviewed scientific
journals, and some 56 scientific works based on JARPA data and material,
presented in symposia and other scientific meetings.85
80. IWC Scientific Permits Page, supra note 50.
81. 1997 SC Report, supra note 8, at 59.
82. See id.
83. See id. In connection both with JARPA and with Japanese research efforts in the
North Pacific (see infra Sections I.B.2, I.B.3), it has sometimes been suggested that the num-
ber of animals being taken is so large, and the program so long in duration, that the program
must perforce be "commercial whaling in disguise," rather than a scientific endeavor. How-
ever, the number of samples is small relative to the size of the populations being sampled,
and, in order to obtain statistically valid results, the sample size must be significant. Further, a
program of many years is necessary to examine trends in population parameters in long-lived
species such as whales. Notably, t he IWC Scientific Committee has not suggested that the
sample size is too large or the duration of the program too long.
84. See, e.g., INT'L WHALING COMMISSION, CHAIRMAN'S REPORT OF THE 50TH ANNUAL
MEETING 55 (1998).
85. See Report of the Intersessional Working Group to Review Data and Results from
[Vol. 32
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On May 12-16, 1997, the IWC held an intensive working group meeting
to assess the program's progress and value. This resulted in the JARPA
Workshop Report, which is also discussed extensively in the 1997 Report of
the IWC Scientific Committee. 6 One legal commentator has suggested the
JARPA Workshop Report confirmed that "JARPA failed to meet its stated
objectives," and characterizes the Report as finding that the program was
"'not required for management."'' 7 Similarly, environmental organizations
like Greenpeace have stated that "the group (which included Japanese scien-
tists) agreed unanimously that the data from JARPA 'were not required for
management,"' and have claimed that "to call [the program] ... 'scientific'
brings both science and the scientific community into disrepute."8 Such
statements grossly distort the Workshop record. While it is true the Work-
shop did not find the JARPA research "required," the IWC itself has stressed
that phrases like "required for management," "essential for management,"
"critical research need," and so forth are value-laden, and have rarely, if
ever, produced consensus in its scientific deliberations. 9 That should not de-
tract, however, from the Workshop's clear recognition of the scientific value
of JARPA.
In fact, the JARPA Workshop Report, which was adopted by the Scien-
tific Committee at its 1997 meeting, presents a positive picture of JARPA
and certainly contains nothing to indicate that it is not a valid scientific en-
deavor. The Workshop examined five components of JARPA: "sighting sur-
veys and abundance estimation, stock structure, biological parameter studies,
marine ecosystem studies, and those addressing environmental change." Its
comments were typically positive. It noted that "[t]here was general agree-
ment that the data presented on stock structure... were important contribu-
tions to the objectives of JARPA and stock management."'" Similarly, "the
meeting agreed that the papers presented have given valuable information on
recruitment, natural mortality, decline in age at sexual maturity and repro-
ductive parameters of minke whales."92 It went on to note that "the informa-
tion produced by JARPA has set the stage for answering many questions
about long term population changes regarding minke whales ... [and] has
Special Permit Research on Minke Whales in the Antarctic, IWC Doc. SC/49/Rep.1, annex
El (1997) [hereinafter JARPA Workshop Report]. As of May 1999, the Japanese IWC Com-
missioner reported that the research program had generated "[o]ver 150 papers," and research
that was important to the Commission in both "quantity and quality." IWC, CHAIRMAN'S
REPORT OF THE 51ST ANNUAL MEETING 29 (1999). The ICR website lists 158 papers. ICR,
Scientific Contribution of the Japanese Whale Research Program Under Special Permit in the
Antarctic (JARPA), at http://www.whalesci.org/contribution.html (last visited May 17, 2001).
86. See 1997 SC Report, supra note 8, at 63.
87. Triggs, supra note 7, at 36.
88. Greenpeace, supra note 32.
89. IWC Scientific Permits Page, supra note 50.
90. 1997 SC Report, supra note 8, at 58.
91. Id. at 61 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 63 (emphasis added).
15
Greenberg et al.: Japan's Whale Research Program and International Law
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2002
166 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 32
already made a major contribution to understanding of certain biological pa-
rameters.9 Moreover, it was optimistic about the future of the program:
[Tihe Committee agreed that none of the sampling and stock identity
problems that had been identified in the JARPA review or subsequently
would in principle prevent JARPA from achieving its objectives in terms
of estimation of biological parameters. All of the identified problems ap-
pear to be addressable. Most members were optimistic that the JARPA
data in conjunction with additional work planned would allow estimation
of the biological parameters with reasonable levels of precision.94
Finally, while the Committee did state that JARPA was not "required
for management," it is important to understand that this statement does not
constitute a value judgment about the program. Rather, it is simply a state-
ment of fact. The Revised Management Procedure (the "RMP") under de-
velopment by the IWC is designed to operate with two inputs: (1) past catch
data, and (2) results of sighting surveys. The JARPA program is not de-
signed to provide input data for running the RMP; it is intended to improve
the RMP software itself. In light of this understanding, the Committee's full
statement yields quite a different picture than might be seen at a glance:
[T]he results of the JARPA program, while not required for management
under the RMP [Revised Management Procedure], have the potential to
improve management of minke whales in the Southern Hemisphere in the
following ways: 1) reductions in the current set of plausible scenarios con-
sidered in Implementation Simulation Trials, and 2) identification of new
scenarios to which future Implementation Simulation Trials will have to be
developed. 95
The JARPA Workshop Report, far from providing a basis for condemn-
ing Japanese research efforts, supports the conclusion that those efforts have
been serious and beneficial. It contains no conclusion that the research is not
legitimate scientific research.
There was disagreement at the JARPA Workshop about whether the
work could be accomplished through non-lethal techniques. In fact, the Sci-
entific Committee agreed that the "logistics and abundance of minke
[whales]... probably precluded [the] application [of non-lethal tech-
niques].t " There are strong arguments that certain studies, such as "the age
of individual whales [which] is an indispensable piece of information in in-
93. Id. at 65 (emphasis added).
94. Id. at 68.
95. Id. at 66. Implementation simulation trials essentially involve computer tests of the
effects of the RMP developed by the Scientific Committee, looking at simulated population
behavior over a long term (100 years) to determine what catch levels may be sustainable.
These trials have been viewed as necessary by the Scientific Committee to evaluate how the
RMP would work in practice. See IWC, Estimates, at http://www.iwcoffice.org/Estimate.htm
(last visited Feb. 24, 2002).
96. 1997 SC Report, supra note 8, at 63.
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terpreting stock structure," "some kinds of genetic analyses on stock struc-
ture," and "studies that are based on morphometrics, parasites, conception
dates, pollutant burdens, etc." cannot be carried out using non-lethal tech-
niques.97 The IWC Secretariat has similarly observed:
[A]t present there are certain data that can only be obtained (at least in the
short-term) using lethal methods. These include, for example, the age of
an animal (obtained from earplugs) and the reproductive status and history
of females (obtained from ovaries). Such information is important inter
alia in any consideration of biological parameters (e.g. mortality and re-
productive rates) and interpretation of pollutant levels.
Fishery biologists would generally agree that, as a practical matter, the
age and size structure of wildlife populations simply cannot be determined
by non-lethal methods."
Since 1997, the 1WC Scientific Committee has repeatedly confirmed its
prior determinations."l Those determinations have not been seriously chal-
lenged. Furthermore, with specific reference to the Commission's most re-
cent guidance (in IWC Resolution 1999-2), the Scientific Committee in 2000
continued to affirm JARPA's relevance for management. While the ongoing
debate about the feasibility of using non-lethal research techniques contin-
ues, there is still "no consensus" on whether the information could be ob-
tained by non-lethal means."'
Ultimately, it must be emphasized that the role of the IWC Scientific
Committee is not to endorse or reject particular research studies or scientific
permits. Rather, it is to provide useful advice and guidance to members and
the Commission. That there is healthy debate within the Scientific Commit-
tee and that no consensus may be reached on certain issues, including the
consistency of proposed research permits with IWC guidelines, scarcely
97. JARPA Workshop Report, supra note 85, Annex H, at 25.
98. IWC Scientific Permits Page, supra note 50.
99. In the United States, for example, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admini-
stration ("NOAA") has repeatedly emphasized that "fishery-dependent research" is an impor-
tant component of any number of studies supporting the management of ocean resources, es-
pecially those relating to the age and size structure of the resources in question. See, e.g.,
NOAA, TnE SALTONSTALL-KENNEDY GRANT PROGRAM: FIsHERIEs RESEARCH AND
DEvELOPMENT 5-8 (2000). But see Gillespie, supra note 78, at 43-44 (arguing that non-lethal
research can provide the information necessary for the IWC's comprehensive assessment of
the effects of the moratorium).
100. See Report of the Scientific Committee, I.W.C. Scientific Committee at 71-79, IWC
Doc. IWC/52/4 (2000) [hereinafter 2000 SC Report]; Report of the Scientific Committee,
I.W.C. Scientific Committee at 73-75, I.W.C. Doc. IWC/51/4 (1999); Report of the Scientific
Committee, IWC Scientific Committee at 54-56, I.W.C. Doc. IWC/50/4 (1998). See also Re-
port of the Scientific Committee, IWC Scientific Committee at 75-76, I.W.C. Doc. IWC/53/4
(2001) [hereinafter 2001 SC Report].
101. 2000 SC Report, supra note 100, at 79. When JARPA was discussed again at the
2001 Scientific Committee meeting, little new was added to the debate. Rather, parties on
both sides of the issue essentially reiterated views expressed in prior meetings. See 2001 SC
REPORT, supra note 100, at 75-76.
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means that the science is bad or that the proponent of the research is acting
in bad faith or for improper purposes. Because of the value placed on whales
in both pro- and anti-whaling nations, debates are often heated, but in the de-
liberations of the IWC Scientific Committee, Japan is not isolated. Scientists
from other countries often support the Japanese position. The debate about
lethal vs. non-lethal research techniques will undoubtedly continue without
"consensus," but that scarcely suggests that the arguments for lethal research
techniques are without scientific merit. In spite of these disagreements, the
Scientific Committee has not only characterized the JARPA program as
"relevant," but has also stated that it has "the potential to improve manage-
ment of minke whales in the Southern Hemisphere." In such circumstances,
there is no basis for concluding that JARPA is not a legitimate scientific en-
terprise.
2. North Pacific Research-the JARPN Program
In 1994, Japan initiated a second component of its research program, a
five year (1994-1999) study focused on the North Pacific and usually re-
ferred to as "JARPN." The purpose of JARPN was to elucidate the stock
structure of minke whales in the North Pacific and to study their feeding
ecology."l Among other things, the program was designed particularly to
"improve the design of RMP Implementation Simulation Trials for the North
Pacific."'' 3 Under this program, Japan issued a scientific permit allowing the
taking of 100 minke whales annually in the North Pacific.
Like JARPA, JARPN has been reviewed at each annual meeting of the
IWC. It also was the subject of an IWC scientific workshop. This workshop
was held on February 7-10, 2000, in Tokyo. Its results were reported to the
IWC Scientific Committee meeting held in Adelaide, Australia, in July,
2000, and the Scientific Committee endorsed recommendations of the Work-
shop's report.'" The 2000 workshop reviewed the methods and results of
JARPN, assessed the further potential of existing data for meeting JARPN
and other objectives, and evaluated whether the program achieved its main
objectives. It made detailed recommendations for future directions of
JARPN research. It did not conclude in any way that the science was without
validity.
When the Scientific Committee considered JARPN in the summer of
2000, it also considered the research in light of the criteria set out in IWC
Resolution 1999-2. As with JARPA, the Scientific Committee made no spe-
cific determination that the research was "required for management."'"5
However, the workshop found, and the Committee agreed, that "information
102. See 2000 SC REPORT, supra note 100, at 71.
103. IWC Scientific Permits Page, supra note 50.
104. See 2000 SC REPORT, supra note 100, at 74.
105. Id.
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obtained during JARPN had been and will continue to be used in the refine-
ment of Implementation Simulation Trials for North Pacific minke whales,
and consequently was relevant to their management."'" With respect to the
feasibility of conducting the research using non-lethal techniques, the Scien-
tific Committee simply referred to its prior discussions of this issue, noting
that "no consensus view was reached." 107
In sum, JARPN, like JARPA, has received continuing and comprehen-
sive review from the IWC Scientific Committee. The Scientific Committee
has provided no basis for concluding that the research is not valid and bene-
ficial.
3. North Pacific Research-the JARPN II Program
In 2000, Japan proposed to expand its research in the North Pacific to
include two new species, Bryde's whales and sperm whales. This initiative is
usually referred to as "JARPN II." Sperm and Bryde's whales were added to
the study because they are likely major components of the total whale bio-
mass in the area."8 Despite the controversy surrounding JARPN II, including
U.S. certification under the Pelly Amendment, JARPN II is no more than a
two-year feasibility study during the years 2000 and 2001. The project in-
volves an annual take of 50 Bryde's whales and 10 sperm whales, plus 100
minke whales (as were previously taken under JARPN), to study feeding
ecology, stock structure and "environmental effects on cetaceans and the ma-
rine ecosystem."" 9 Its priority is feeding ecology."'
The JARPN II proposal, like all proposed Japanese scientific permits,
was circulated to the Scientific Committee in advance of its 2000 meeting in
Adelaide, Australia. While there obviously has not yet been time to review
JARPN II at a workshop comparable to those held for JARPA and JARPN,
the Scientific Committee did consider the proposal in some detail at its 2000
meeting. It applied the criteria discussed above, examining the proposal, its
objectives, its methodology, effects of catch on the stock, and research coop-
eration.' It is fair to say that debate was heated. As described by the IWC
Secretariat, "There was considerable disagreement within the Committee
over most aspects of this research programme, including objectives, meth-
odology, likelihood of success and effect on stocks.""2 Again, however, vig-
106. Id.
107. Id. In 2001, JARPN was not discussed directly by the Scientific Committee, having
essentially been subsumed by the successor program discussed below. See 2001 SC REPORT,
supra note 100, at 74-75.
108. See ICR, Questions and Answers: Japan's whale research programs, at
http://www.whalesci.org/Q&Ajapanswhaleresearchpro2.html (last visited May 17, 2001).
109. IWC Scientific Permits Page, supra note 50.
110. Seeid.
111. See 2000 SC REPORT, supra note 100, at 74-78.
112. IWC Scientific Permits Page, supra note 50.
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orous disagreements scarcely demonstrate that the research is somehow
without scientific merit. For example, with respect to the objectives of
JARPN II, some members of the Scientific Committee "expressed concern
that most of the objectives of the programme did not address questions of
high priority for the rational management of the stocks concerned."" 3 Even
these members, however, agreed that "the primary objective of the pro-
posal... was scientific in nature.""'
Moreover, the critics' views were countered by those of other members
who
drew attention to the ambitious nature of the programme and drew paral-
lels with the feeding ecology programme carried out by Norway, which
also began with a feasibility study and has now made a valuable contribu-
tion towards multispecies modelling [sic] and management. They also
noted the need to determine the impact of cetaceans on fish stocks as a
matter of some urgency. Thus in addition to the information on North Pa-
cific minke whale stock structure relevant to Implementation Simulation
Trials, they believed that it represented an attempt to address a critically
important research need."'
Some members raised methodological issues, relating to sample size
and methods proposed, noting that, in their judgment, "it was unlikely that
several of the objectives of the programe would be met," especially with
respect to sperm whales." 6 Still, others responded "that this was a feasibility
study and that one of the aims was to investigate the methodology. They re-
ferred to the success of the earlier Norwegian programme. They felt that the
sperm whale component was important in the context of trophic levels.""' 7
These same members "felt that all aspects of the programme would improve
as data became available."". In short, the debate was not different than much
of the debate in the past about the scientific details of Japan's research pro-
posals, with strongly expressed opinions on many aspects of the proposal.
The Scientific Committee did not address the criteria of IWC Resolution
1999-2 in great detail in its deliberations on JARPN II. The Committee
reached no consensus on whether the studies were "required for manage-
ment" or whether the research could be accomplished by non-lethal tech-
niques. With respect to the former, however, the criterion is only marginally
relevant at the feasibility study stage. With respect to the latter, where, as is
apparent from the discussions above, the Scientific Committee is consis-
tently unable to come to unanimous agreement, it was pointed out yet again,
to those who believed "insufficient use had been made of presently existing
113. INT'LWHALING COMMISSION, CHAIRMAN'S REPORT OF THE 52ND ANNuAL MEETING
40 (2000) [hereinafter 2000 CHAIRMAN'S REPORT].
114. IWC Scientific Permits Page, supra note 50.
115. 2000 CHAIRMAN's REPORT, supra note 113, at 40.
116. Id. at 41.
117. Id.
118. IWC Scientific Permits Page, supra note 50.
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samples and data," that "detailed information" is unavailable from biopsy




In sum, contrary to the opinions of Secretary Mineta and Greenpeace,
JARPN II, like its predecessors, represents legitimate science. One's views
about the importance of whales and their place in the ecosystem, the ethics
of whale harvest or the hypothetical desirability of non-lethal techniques
should not cloud one's judgment on this fundamental point.
C. The Japanese Research Program and IWC Resolutions
Despite the history of the IWC's scientific review of Japan's research
program, the Commission has adopted a series of resolutions calling upon
the Japanese to refrain from undertaking various aspects of their program.
For example, in 2000, the IWC adopted two resolutions related to Japan's
program. The first, IWC Resolution 2000-4, after noting that certain ques-
tions have been raised about the size of minke whale populations in the Ant-
arctic, 2 ' "REQUESTS that the Government of Japan refrains from issuing
any Special Permits for the 2000/2001 season for the take of minke whales
in the Southern Ocean Sanctuary.'' The second, IWC Resolution 2000-5,
after reciting that "concerns" were raised by the Scientific Committee about
JARPN II and that the Committee "did not endorse the JARPN II proposal,"
AFFIRMS that gathering information on interactions between whales and
prey species is not a critically important issue which justifies the killing of
whales for research purposes;
PROPOSES that information on stock structure, which may be relevant to
management, be obtained using non-lethal means;
STRONGLY URGES the Government of Japan to refrain from issuing
special permits for whaling under JARPN 11.121
In 2001, the IWC also adopted two resolutions related to Japan's pro-
gram that were very similar to those adopted in 2000. The first, IWC Resolu-
119. 2000 CHAIRMAN'S REPORT, supra note 113, at 41. At the 2001 Scientific Committee
meeting in London, JARPN II was discussed largely by reference to what had been said in
2000. See 2001 SC REPORT, supra note 100, at 74-75. For example, while some "questioned
again the need for lethal sampling of minke whales in the North Pacific in the context of stock
structure," nonetheless "counter-arguments" were also presented. Id. at 75. See also id., an-
nexes Q3 and Q4. In addition, at least one non-Japanese member of the Committee affirmed
that the program "would... provide useful information for managing fishery resources in the
Caribbean and the wider international community." 2001 SC Report, supra note 100, at 75.
120. See infra Section I.D (discussing the status of minke whales in the Antarctic).
121. Resolution on Whaling Under Special Permit in the Southern Ocean Sanctuary,
IWC Resolution 2000-4, in 2000 CHAIRMAN's REPORT, supra note 113, at 66 app. 1.
122. Resolution on Whaling Under Special Permit in the Northern Pacific Ocean, IWC
Resolution 2000-5, in 2000 CHAIRMAN'S REPORT, supra note 113, at 66 in app. 1. IWC Reso-
lution 2000-5 also cites IWC Resolution 1995-9, which "recommended that scientific research
involving the killing of cetaceans should only be permitted in exceptional circumstances
where the questions address critically important issues which cannot be answered by the
analysis of existing data and/or use of non-lethal research techniques." Id.
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tion 2001-7, after expressing concern "that the [2001] Scientific Committee
report cannot rule out that the Southern Hemisphere minke whale population
may have suffered a precipitous decline over the past decade,"
"STRONGLY URGES the Government of Japan to halt the lethal takes of
minke whales conducted under the JARPA programme, at least until the Sci-
entific Committee has reported to the Commission on the impacts of the
JARPA programme on the stocks of minke whales in Areas IV and V."''
The second, IWC Resolution 2001-8, after "NOTING the concern of many
members of the Scientific Committee [regarding] the lack of any quantifi-
able objectives in JARPN II" and "FURTHER NOTING that the data col-
lected by lethal sampling of sperm, minke and Bryde's whales in JARPN II
are not essential in the context of the RMP,"
AFFIRMS that data gathered under JARPN II on interactions between
whales and prey species are not sufficient to justify the killing of these
whales for research purposes;
PROPOSES that any information needed on stock structure can and
should be obtained using non-lethal means;
STRONGLY URGES the Government of Japan for the reasons given
above to refrain from issuing any special permit for whaling under JARPN
11.124
It is important to understand that, whatever its nominal obligation to
rely on the advice of its Scientific Committee, at least when amending the
Schedule,1 25 the Commission is essentially a political body, and its resolu-
tions are adopted by simple majority vote. At the same time, there is little
doubt that the IWC is dominated by "anti-whaling" countries with little
sympathy for efforts, however valid scientifically, that might establish a
predicate for the resumption of commercial whaling. That a majority of
Commissioners may vote in favor of a particular resolution calling upon Ja-
pan to refrain from certain whale research does not signify that in fact such
resolution is based on an objective scientific assessment of the merits and
demerits of the Japanese program.
126
123. Resolution on Southern Hemisphere Minke Whales and Special Permit Whaling,
IWC Resolution 2001-7, at http:leelink.netl-asilwildlife/53IWC.html [hereinafter Resolution
2001-7].
124. Resolution on Expansion of JARPN 11 Whaling in North Pacific, IWC Resolution
2001-8, at http://eelink.net/-asilwildlife/53IWC.html.
125. ICRW, supra note 1, art. V, 2. The Convention specifies that amendments to the
Schedule "shall be based on scientific findings."
126. See generally TOWARD A SUSTAINABLE WHALING REGIME (Robert L. Friedheim ed.,
2001) (for a comprehensive discussion of the sharp divisions between "anti-whaling" and
"pro-whaling" countries currently marking the deliberations of the IWC). Indeed, in the for-
ward to this work, the former U.S. IWC Commissioner, John Knauss, pointedly remarks, "As
an example of good faith international negotiations, the IWC is mostly a disaster." John A.
Knauss, Forward to TOWARD A SUSTAINABLE WHALING REGIME, at vii, viii (Robert L. Fried-
heim ed., 2001). Professor Friedheim notes, "How science has been used in the IWC ... is a
dismal story." Robert L. Friedheim, Introduction: IWC as a Contested Regime, in TOWARD A
SUSTAINABLE WHALING REGIME 3, 22 (Robert L. Friedheim ed., 2001).
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In connection with the resolution adopted in July 2000 in Adelaide, the
divergence between the Commission action and the report of the Scientific
Committee was most manifest. As noted above, IWC Resolution 2000-5 ex-
pressly emphasized the purported position of the Scientific Committee, not-
ing that it "did not endorse" JARPN II. The action by the Commission led
the Chair of the Scientific Committee to deliver an unusual rebuke to the
Commission. As reported in the IWC Chairman's 2000 Report:
The Chair of the Scientific Committee indicated that she was disturbed by
the way the Scientific Committee's deliberations were misrepresented in
the discussions of JARPN II by some delegations. The Scientific Commit-
tee neither endorsed nor rejected Japan's research proposal. Its role is to
provide constructive criticism and report all views to the Commission. 127
In short, it was simply unfair and erroneous for the Commission to
premise its action on the asserted failure of the Scientific Committee to en-
dorse JARPN II.
Moreover, the actions of the Commission have been far from unani-
mous. Environmental groups like Greenpeace have referred to the "over-
whelming majority" of Commission members urging Japan not to proceed
and "call[ing] [JARPN H's] scientific value into question.' 1 28 This leaves the
impression that Commission action is taken scarcely without debate. In fact,
the Commission action in July 2000 was taken after extensive debate, with a
substantial number of dissenters. Thus, during discussion of 1WC Resolution
2000-5, many countries, including Norway, China, St. Lucia, Antigua and
Barbuda, harking back to discussions within the Scientific Committee, de-
fended the scientific basis for JARPN II and its value to the Commission's
management responsibilities. 29 The final vote on the resolution was 19 to 12,
with two abstentions-something less than an overwhelming majority. 3 °
Similarly, IWC Resolution 2000-4, dealing with the JARPA program, was
adopted only by a vote of 20 for and 10 against, with three abstentions. 3' At
the IWC's 2001 meeting, Resolutions 2001-7 and 2001-8 were adopted by
votes of 21 for, 14 against and 1 abstention, and 20 for, 14 against and 2 ab-
stentions, respectively.'32
Finally, the official IWC Secretariat descriptions of Commission action,
as opposed to the gloss put on that action by individual governments and
non-governmental organizations, are much more even-handed in their pres-
127. 2000 CHAIRMAN's REPORT, supra note 113, at 44.
128. Greenpeace, Japan Disregards Blair and Clinton and Starts New Whale Hunt in
North Pacific (July 29, 2000), at http://www.greenpeace.org/pressreleases/oceans/2000jul29.
html.
129. See 2000 CHAiRMAN's REPORT, supra note 113, at 43-44.
130. See id. at 44. Several Commission members noted that there was not "clear guid-
ance" from the Scientific Committee on the matters addressed in the Resolution. Id.
131. See id. at 45.
132. Personal communication from Julie Creek, IWC Secretariat (Oct. 4, 2001) (on file
with the authors).
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entation. The Secretariat is careful, for example, to explain that there are
views on all sides within the Scientific Committee and that," the review of
any permits rarely result [sic] in unanimity."'' Implicitly, the Secretariat is
saying that, no matter what Commission resolutions may say, it is not fair to
rely upon the purported views of the Scientific Committee in asserting that
the JARPA or JARPN research activities are bad science or otherwise scien-
tifically unjustified. A fair reading of the Secretariat's entire description of
the scientific permit question certainly leaves the impression that Japanese
research activities are within the bounds of legitimate inquiry. As noted at
the outset of this article, the IWC Secretary, Dr. Gambell, has made it clear
that these activities address important management questions and fall
"within the terms of the Convention that we operate." 3"
While the IWC resolutions may accurately convey the political positions
of the majority of the Commissioners, they scarcely establish that Japanese
research activities lack scientific merit or are inconsistent with the Conven-
tion.
D. Japanese Research and Its Impact on Whale Stocks
Last of all, it might be claimed that, even if the Japanese research pro-
gram is consistent with the rights recognized under Article VIII of the Con-
vention and constitutes good science, it would cause biological harm to
whale populations and should not be permitted. The argument would be that
research cannot and should not conflict with the purpose of the Convention,
embodied in the Preamble, to assure the viability of whale stocks. To some
extent, this concern is reflected in the most recent IWC resolutions (2000-4
and 2001-7) concerning research in the Antarctic.33 Yet, the Scientific
Committee has never suggested that the numbers of animals taken in the
Japanese program are a cause for concern, and there is little, if any, support
for the proposition that the removal levels are not biologically sustainable.
JARPA involves the taking of a single whale species, the minke whale,
in the Southern Ocean. In 1990, based upon surveys conducted in the 1980s,
the Scientific Committee estimated the population of this species to be ap-
133. IWC Scientific Permits Page, supra note 50.
134. BBC News Online Forum Interview with Dr. Ray Gambell, IWC Secretary (July 5,
2000), at http://newsvote.bbc.co.uklhilenglishltalking-pointlforumlnewsid_817000/817116.
stm.
135. Resolution on Whaling Under Special Permit in the Southern Ocean Sanctuary,
IWC Resolution 2000-4, in 2000 CHAIRMAN'S REPORT, supra note 113, at 66 in app. 1. The
resolution notes that recent estimates of minke whale populations in the Antarctic are "appre-
ciably lower" that previously accepted by the Scientific Committee, and recognizes "the ur-
gent need for the Scientific Committee to proceed with the planned review of the estimates of
population sizes of minke whales ... prior to seeking advice from the Commission on how to
assess the impact of JARPA on these stocks." Id. See also Resolution 2001-7, supra note 123,
(noting the possibility that "Southern Hemisphere minke whales may have suffered a precipi-
tous decline over the past decade.").
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proximately 760,000, and this figure was generally accepted for a number of
years.'36 In 1992, the IWC Scientific Committee calculated that 2000 minke
whales could be taken from the Antarctic each year for the next 100 years
without any threat to the stock.'37 In 1993, the IWC Secretary, Dr. Gambell,
observed, "[i]n all reasonableness we would have to say that a commercial
catch could be taken without endangering [minke] stocks.' 13' Taking a
maximum of 440 animals a year from this population for research purposes
raises no significant biological questions.
More recently, as reflected in IWC Resolution 2000-4 and IWC Resolu-
tion 2001-7 some concerns have been raised about the accuracy of the 1990
minke whale population estimate. At the 2000 IWC meeting, the Scientific
Committee noted that the 760,000 animals were "no longer appropriate es-
timates of current minke whale abundance.' 1 39 The Committee stated, "Some
initial crude extrapolations ... led to a point estimate that was appreciably
lower than the total of the previously agreed point estimates by Area from
the Comprehensive Assessment.""
Still, the Committee's inability to provide "reliable estimates" of the
current minke whale population does not necessarily mean that the Japanese
scientific taking permits are problematic. In fact, the Scientific Committee
observed that "it was not possible to conclude whether the appreciable dif-
ference noted ... was statistically significant."'' It was suggested, moreover,
that the 1990 assessment of 760,000 did not include dwarf minke whales,
and, based upon earlier population estimates, it was possible that the 760,000
number was above the "carrying capacity" for the species. 42 In any event,
the Scientific Committee in 2000, while identifying the issue of stock size,
did not provide advice to the Commission indicating that the level of take
would or could have an adverse impact on the stock. It simply agreed to
work intersessionally on questions related to possible impacts, including
"questions of changing carrying capacity."'' 3 And, again in 2001, the Scien-
tific Committee affirmed that "further modelling approaches need to be ex-
amined and abundance estimates agreed before specific advice on the effect
136. IWC, Estimates, at http://www.iwcoffice.org/Estimate.htm (last visited Feb. 24,
2002).
137. See Annex 1, Report of the Working Group on Implementation Trials, app. 2, table
1, at 161-66, in INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE 43RD INTERNATIONAL
WHALING COMMISsION (1993).
138. Michael Hornsby, Britain tells Norway to choose between EC and whaling, TIMES
(LONDON), May 4, 1993, LEXIS, Nexis Library.
139. 2000 CHAIRMAN'S REPORT, supra note 113, at 28.
140. Id. See also IWC Scientific Permits Page, supra note 50 (noting "the Committee
agrees that it does not have current best estimates for Southern Hemisphere minke whales,
noting that in some areas they may be appreciably lower"). In 2001, the Scientific Committee
made no new pronouncements on this issue. See 2001 SC REPORT, supra note 100, at 75-76.
141. 2000 CHAIRMAN'S REPORT, supra note 113, at 28.
142. Id. at 33.
143. 2000 SC REPORT, supra note 100, at 79.
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of JARPA on Antarctic minke whales can be provided."'' " In such circum-
stances, even if the population is "appreciably lower" than 760,000 animals,
there is no basis for concluding at this time that an annual take of no more
than 440 animals is unacceptable.
In the North Pacific, initially under JARPN and now under JARPN II,
Japan has taken 100 minke whales annually. The IWC reports that "[t]he
most recent population estimate for minke whales in the western North Pa-
cific and Okhotsk Sea is about 25,000.' 44 Based upon standard assessment
techniques and a variety of stock structure hypotheses, "the proponents [of
the study] concluded that the effect on the minke whale stock is negligi-
ble. 14' 6 There was some discussion within the Scientific Committee at the
2000 meeting as to whether the measures used to assess effects were ade-
quate, though a number of members "believed that the approach taken used
the best data available and the conclusion was valid.' 47 In any event, the
Scientific Committee provided no basis for concluding that this level of take
was not sustainable, and, at its 2001 meeting, the Scientific Committee made
no suggestion to the contrary.'48
Finally, JARPN II involves the taking of 50 Bryde's whales and 10
sperm whales annually in the North Pacific. The IWC Secretariat has pointed
out that "[a] preliminary estimate of abundance for western North Pacific
Bryde's whales is about 22,000."'" 9 The scientists responsible for JARPN II,
using the same methodology as that used for North Pacific minke whales,
also concluded that the effect of this level of take was "negligible."'5 During
the Scientific Committee's discussion, the validity of this conclusion was
apparently not questioned.' As for sperm whales, the IWC has no abun-
dance estimates for the North Pacific stocks.' However, as stated by the
proponents of the study, "While no calculation was made for the sperm
whales, the sample size is so small that [it] is clearly below the critical level
to affect the stock."'53 Once again, the Scientific Committee discussion at the
2000 meeting did not call this conclusion into doubt, and, at its 2001 meet-
144. 2001 SC REPORT, supra note 100, at 74.
145. IWC Scientific Permits Page, supra note 50.
146. 2000 CHAIRMAN'S REPORT, supra note 113, at 41. See also 2000 SC REPORT, supra
note 100, at 78.
147. 2000 SC REPORT, supra note 100, at 78.
148. See 2001 SC REPORT, supra note 100, at 75.
149. IWC Scientific Permits Page, supra note 50.
150. 2000 SC REPORT, supra note 100, at 78.
151. See id.
152. Despite the absence of current, reliable estimates of total abundance, researchers
have suggested that the North Pacific population of sperm whales is measured in the hundreds
of thousands and is perhaps as high as almost one million, while the regional stock of sperm
whales may exceed 100,000 animals. See NOAA, 1998 MARINE MAMMAL STOCK
ASSESSMENT REPORT 111-112 (1998). See also NOAA, 61(1) MARINE FishERIES REvIEW 63
(1999). Regardless of the precise size of the stock, it is highly unlikely that taking 10 animals
annually would pose any substantial threat.
153. 2000 SC REPORT, supra note 100, at 78.
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ing, no different conclusions were suggested by the Committee's delibera-
tions." 4
There is little reason to believe that Japanese research is having any ad-
verse impact on whale stocks.
II. THE NATURE OF THE ABUSE OF RIGHT DOCTRINE UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Even if Article VIII of the ICWR were less specific than it is, or Japan's
research program were less grounded in science than it is, Japan's program
could only constitute an abuse of right if such a principle existed in interna-
tional law. A review of the sources of international law suggests that there is
substantial uncertainty as to the existence of the principle and, if it does ex-
ist, there is certainly no consensus as to its precise contours or how it should
apply in particular cases.
Under international law, "apart from any convention, in order that a
State may incur responsibility it is necessary that an unlawful international
act be imputed to it, that is, that there exist a violation of a duty imposed by
an international juridical standard."' 55 Some commentators assert that there
exists in international law an extra-treaty rule that prohibits nations from
abusing their rights and thereby governs the conduct of nations regardless of
whether there is a specific treaty provision prohibiting such abuse.15 At least
one such commentator not only asserts that such a principle exists in interna-
tional law, based upon "'general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations,"' 157 including Article 300 of the 1982 United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea,158 but also that Japan's whale research program may
154. See 2001 SC REPORT, supra note 100, at 75.
155. Dickson Car Wheel Co. v. United Mexican States, 4 R.I.A.A. 669, 678 (1931). See
also B.O. Iluyomade, The Scope and Content of a Complaint of Abuse of Right in Interna-
tional Law, 16 HARV. INT'L L.J. 47, 73 (1975).
156. Among those scholars who contend that an abuse of right rule exists in international
law, some take the position that abuse of right is closely related to, if not identical with, the
concepts of "good faith" or "bad faith." See, e.g., BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 121 (1953). The
term "bad faith" is thought to comprise some element of dishonesty, fraud or malice. Iluyo-
made, supra note 155, at 51. Accordingly, proof of bad faith is-difficult to establish, because
proof of subjective intent, i.e., motive, is required. See G.D.S. Taylor, The Content of the Rule
Against Abuse of Rights in International Law, 46 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 323, 333 (1972-73).
Consequently, some scholars take pains to distinguish "abuse of right" and "bad faith," assert-
ing that the finding of a bad motive is not required to prove an abuse of right. Id. at 333-36.
Although it has been stated that "[t]he prohibition of malicious injury is an important aspect
of the theory of abuse of right as it has been applied in most Continental legal systems," BIN
CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS
AND TRIBUNALS 121 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter CHENG], for purposes of this discussion, we
will assume arguendo that abuse of right may not only be synonymous with bad faith, but
may also be something other than bad faith.
157. Triggs, supra note 7, at 37.
158. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3,
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constitute such an abuse of right. That is, that Japan may have exercised its
right under the ICRW "for a purpose [contrary to the purpose] for which it
was conferred" and that the program would therefore be nothing more than a
"sham to avoid a legal obligation." '59
A review of the various possible sources of an abuse of right principle
fails to substantiate the premise for the argument just described. At the out-
set it should be noted that there is disagreement as to the appropriate source
or sources of international law allegedly supporting the existence of an abuse
of right doctrine even among those commentators who agree that such a doc-
trine in some form exists in international law. Some, such as B. 0. Iluyo-
made, have determined that the concept of abuse of right is most likely to
find a place in international law under Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, which refers to "'the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations' as a source of law. '""w Others, such as G. D.
S. Taylor, Bin Cheng, and Sir Hersch Lauterpacht rely primarily on judicial
decisions for support.6 Still others, such as F.V. Garcia Amador and Profes-
sor Triggs, seek support from recognized general principles of law, judicial
decisions, specific treaty provisions, and the writings of highly qualified ju-
ridical thinkers."
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (which re-
peats the identical formulation of its predecessor, the Permanent Court of In-
ternational Justice) is generally recognized as an authoritative formulation of
the sources of international law both inside and outside the International
Court of Justice.'63 Article 38(1) enumerates those sources as follows:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing
rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teach-
ings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as sub-
sidiary means for the determination of rules of law.'
397, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS].
159. Triggs, supra note 7, at 59.
160. luyomade, supra note 155, at 53.
161. See generally Taylor, supra note 156; CHENG, supra note 156, at 121-36; HERSCH
LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
162-165 (Grotius Publications Limited 1982).
162. See generally F.V. Garcia Amador, State Responsibility: Some New Problems, 94
RECUEIL DES couRs 24 (1958) [hereinafter Amadori; Triggs, supra note 7.
163. See Wolfgang Friedmann, The Uses of "General Principles" in the Development of
International Law, 57 A.J.I.L. 279 (1963); Iluyomade, supra note 155, at 53; Triggs, supra
note 7, at 37.
164. Statute of the International Court of Justice, Jun. 26, 1945, art. 38, T.S. No. 993, 3
Bevans 1179.
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Since all of these sources have been relied upon to varying degrees in
discussions of an abuse of right principle, we will review each, starting in
this Section with municipal law and the opinion of scholars.'" Rather than
demonstrating the existence of a "general principle," the municipal laws of
"civilized nations" reveal a significant diversity among them on the recogni-
tion and application of an abuse of right principle. In turn, commentators
have articulated equally diverse formulations of an international obligation
to avoid abuse of right, and their attempts at formulating a rule lack suffi-
cient dimension to permit its application with any predictability.
While international courts have referred to an abuse of right, they have
provided little guidance as to its substantive content. In fact, no international
tribunal, including the WTO Appellate Body in the Shrimp Case, has ex-
pressly founded liability on such an abuse of right doctrine. Because of the
arguable significance of the Shrimp Case to the law as developed by interna-
tional tribunals, we deal with this source separately in Section III. Finally,
given the importance of the Southern Bluefin Tuna Case, and the application
of Article 300 and other parts of UNCLOS to recent arguments that Japan
has abused its rights under the Convention, we discuss the significance of
that case in particular and UNCLOS in general in Section IV. Neither case
provides authority for an international tribunal to apply an abuse of right rule
to Japan's research program.
A. Pertinent Municipal Law
B. 0. Iluyomade and H. C. Gutteridge, upon whose writings Iluyomade
substantially relies, have conducted perhaps the most comprehensive surveys
of the law of civilized nations as it relates to abuse of right. Consequently,
much of the following analysis is drawn from these surveys. Although they
may be dated, the surveys conducted by Iluyomade and Gutteridge are still
pertinent to this inquiry in that commentators continue to rely upon them for
the proposition that a general principle of abuse of right can be gleaned from
the laws of the nations surveyed.1"
From the outset, it should be noted that Iluyomade suggests that what is
involved in Article 38 is the application of "'principles, not rules.""'  Con-
sequently, "[wihat is involved in the application of a general principle of law
recognized by civilized nations is, then, the use of municipal law analogies
165. While "[ilt is tempting to regard the principle of good faith or abuse of right as one
of customary international law in the sense that nations always act in good faith and expect
each other nation to do likewise[,] ... this line of reasoning assumes that which must be
proven." luyomade, supra note 155, at 53 n.34. Consequently, international custom is typi-
cally not relied upon as a source for supporting the existence of an abuse of right principle.
166. See Triggs, supra note 7, at 37 n.26 (referencing citations contained in IAN
BROWNLEE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 444 n.74 (4th ed. 1990)).
167. Iluyomade, supra note 155, at 54 (quoting BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF
LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 24 (1953)).
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to fashion a viable system of rules for international law."'6 However, even
given this distinction, these reviews of the pertinent municipal law demon-
strate that there is no general principle of abuse of right which emerges and
is recognized by civilized nations from which to fashion a viable interna-
tional rule of abuse of right. There is little agreement among nations on what
constitutes an abuse of right or even whether such a principle exists.
The differences in municipal law are manifest. Mexican and German
law appear to be quite similar to each other in their recognition of an abuse
of right principle. The Mexican Code contemplates a very restrictive view of
an abuse of right. A complainant must prove that in exercising the right and
causing the damage complained of, the actor received no benefit and the ac-
tor's sole motivation was to harm the complainant.'" Similarly, under the
German Code, an abuse of a right occurs only when there is no legitimate
purpose for exercising it and the purpose is to injure another. It would also
appear that the harm must be intentionally inflicted.' Thus, both require that
a right may not be exercised where the sole motivation is to cause the injury
that is the subject of the complaint. However, that is where the similarity
ends. Under French law, a right must be exercised so as to avoid doing harm
to others to the extent possible.'7' The Swiss Code is very broad and vague,
requiring every person to exercise his rights according to the principles of
good faith and stating that the manifest abuse of a right will not be pro-
tected. Swiss judges, however, have placed greater emphasis on the obliga-
tion to act in good faith and have limited their review to ascertaining
whether the conduct complained of is honest or not.'73 Under Soviet law, a
right was to be exercised so as not to harm the community or the state.
Unlike other codes, the intention to inflict harm was not a criterion and it
was not required that the right was exercised in a manner that conflicted with
the interests of another individual for the exercise to fall within the prohibi-
tion.' Instead, the only test was whether an act was injurious to the commu-
nity or the state.'75 U.S. law and Ethiopian law appear to be similar to each
other. Under both U.S. and Ethiopian law, a property right may not be exer-
cised so as to intentionally inflict harm on a neighbor.76 Australia and Can-
ada place limits on the discretion of their governments when they act osten-
sibly under their permitted authority but in reality act for another purpose
168. luyomade, supra note 155, at 54.
169. See luyomade, supra note 155, at 56-57; BROWNLIE, supra note 166, at 444.
170. See Iluyomade, supra note 155, at 56; H.C. Gutteridge, Abuse of Rights, 5
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 22, 36 (1933).
171. See Gutteridge, supra note 170, at 35.
172. See id. at 39; Iluyomade, supra note 155, at 56.
173. See Gutteridge, supra note 170, at 40.
174. See Iluyornade, supra note 155, at 56; Gutteridge, supra note 170, at 41.
175. See Iluyornade, supra note 155, at 56; Gutteridge, supra note 170, at 41-42.
176. See Iluyomade, supra note 155, at 57-58.
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unrelated to their authority and thereby cause injury. 77 British law does not
recognize an abuse of right principle."
What is the general principle that is recognized? Gutteridge does not
find a common principle. He concludes that:
There is... a factor which is common to all continental systems of law in
the recognition of the principle that a proprietary right must not be utilized
for the sole purpose of injuring one's neighbor, but when we go beyond
this point the question becomes veiled in mist and it is impossible to de-
fine the limits within which effect will be given to the theory. 79
Perhaps more importantly, the surveys of Gutteridge and Iluyomade are
limited and do not include numerous "civilized nations" around the globe.
Consequently, it is unclear whether their sampling is representative of the
municipal laws of other "civilized nations." Thus, even if a general principle
of abuse of right could be gleaned from analyzing the laws of these rela-
tively few nations, it is uncertain if such a principle is in fact sufficiently
"recognized" to "fashion a viable system of rules for international law." ' A
1989 report to the Council of Europe compared the municipal laws of its
member states on abuse of right. Its introductory remarks are quite pertinent:
This report will bear the stamp of diversity. The European states have very
few points in common as regards the definition of abuse of rights, condi-
tions of implementation, areas of application and, finally, legal effects. So
few, in fact, that it can be stated right away, as a first preliminary remark,
that there are almost as many conceptions of the abuse of rights as there
are member states of the Council of Europe. And that is not all: this diver-
sity is further accentuated by the fact that, within most countries, there is
no unanimous agreement as to the scope of the prohibition of abuse of
rights; doctrinal disputes and contradictory judgments are commonplace. 8'
If such could be said of the then 23 European member states of the
Council of Europe, what might be said of the current 43 member states?
What might be said if other "civilized nations" were included in such a re-
view?
In short, rather than demonstrating that there is a general principle pro-
hibiting the abuse of right recognized by civilized nations,'82 the analyses
conducted by Gutteridge and Iluyomade show that there is little agreement
177. See id. at 60.
178. See id. at 57; Gutteridge, supra note 170, at 22 (citing Mayor of Bradford v. Pickles
[1895] A.C. 587, 600).
179. Gutteridge, supra note 170, at 42-43 (emphasis added).
180. Iluyomade, supra note 155, at 54.
181. Joseph Voyame, et al., Abuse of Rights in Comparative Law, in COUNCIL OF
EUROPE, ABUSE OF RIGHTS AND EQUIVALENT CONCEPTS: THE PRINCIPLE AND ITS PRESENT DAY
APPICATION: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINETEENTH COLLOQUY ON EUROPEAN LAW 23, 23 (1989).
182. See infra Section II.B.1.
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among nations on what constitutes an abuse of right, or even whether such a
principle exists.
B. Teachings of the "Most Highly Qualified Publicists"
In the absence of a general principle of abuse of right recognized by
civilized nations and any rules established by international tribunals ,
"highly qualified publicists" have fashioned their own "rules" on abuse of
right. Given the basis upon which legal scholars must build, their "problem"
is as much "demonstrating that such a concept does [exist]" as it is demon-
strating that it "at least ought to exist in international law."'83 The formula-
tions derived by legal scholars are as diverse as the municipal codes dis-
cussed above. Consequently, no general rule of abuse of right emerges.
Further, such "rules" lack an articulation of the burden of proof, standards
and indicia upon which to judge the general rule, and the appropriate reme-
dies for breach. Thus, nations have no notice of the rule upon which they
may be judged.
1. Specific Formulations of Abuse of Right
Although there are important variations within certain categories, the
formulations of leading scholars who conclude that a rule against the abuse
of right exists in international law may be categorized under five headings
which characterize the thrust of each formulation: (1) "Intent to Injure;" (2)
"Contrary Purpose;" (3) "Balancing of Rights;" (4) "Do no Harm;" and (5)
"Act Honestly." A final category, which includes those who hold that there is
no such rule prohibiting an abuse of right in international law, will be dis-
cussed in this Section's conclusion.
e Intent to Injure. In its formulation of an abuse of right rule, the Inter-
national Law Association (the "ILA") bases wrongfulness on an in-
tent to injure. Its formulation is as follows:
No one may exercise his rights in such a manner as to damage another
when causing this damage is the purpose of exercising such rights.84
Similarly, although Ian Brownlie ultimately concludes that an abuse of
right principle does not exist in positive law, he defines the doctrine to be
examined as exemplified by Article 1912 of the Mexican Civil Code:
When damage is caused to another by the exercise of a right, there is an
obligation to make it good if it is proved that the right was exercised only
in order to cause the damage, without any advantage to the person entitled
183. Iluyomade, supra note 155, at 53 (emphasis added).
184. INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE FirY-EIGHT CONFERENCE 404
(1980).
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to the right. 85
* Contrary Purpose. B. 0. Iluyomade finds that an abuse of right under
international law is:
[T]he prohibition of the exercise of a right for an end different from that
for which the right was created, to the injury of another person or the com-
S186
mumty.
G. D. S. Taylor constructs an abuse of right rule that focuses on the pur-
pose of the exercise of the right as follows:
[N]o person may, under international law, exercise a power for a reason,
actual or inferred, which is contrary to the purpose or purposes for which
international law contemplates the power will be used.'
Both Iluyomade and Taylor assert that the intent element is objective
rather than subjective.8 Thus, as Taylor puts it, "[t]he object is to find
whether the facts indicate a defective reason without attempting to find that
the State had that reason actually in mind."' 9 Taylor differs from Iluyomade
in suggesting that a complaining State need not show that the defendant
State's improper actions resulted in any injury. It is enough that an obliga-
tion is avoided."l
* Balancing of Rikhts. In Wolfgang Friedmann's view, the rule against
abuse of right merely says that
[W]hatever [a nation's legal] rights are, they must not be used in such a
manner that itg anti-social effects outweigh the legitimate interests of the
owner of the right.' 9'
Sir Hersch Lauterpacht constructs a similar rule:
185. BROWNLE, supra note 166, at 444.
186. Iluyomade, supra note 155, at 48.
187. Taylor, supra note 156, at 352.
188. Iluyomade supra note 155, at 77; Taylor, supra note 156, at 333.
189. Taylor, supra note 156, at 333. As noted at the outset of Section II, Professor
Triggs' formulation also falls into the contrary purpose category. Triggs, supra note 7, at 59.
With respect to Japan's research activities, she suggests that the appropriate test is whether
the "primary purpose" of the program is to "enable scientific research or to facilitate the sup-
ply of whale meat to a commercial market." Id. at 52. Subsequently, she implies a more
objective test by indicating that a finding of abuse of right would depend on evidence of the
commercial purpose of the program "in the absence of any significant scientific research be-
ing undertaken." Id. at 53.
190. Cf Judge Read's dicta in the Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4, 370
("The doctrine of abuse of right cannot be invoked by one unless the state which is admittedly
exercising its right under international law causes damage to the state invoking the doc-
trine.").
191. Friedmann, supra note 163, at 288.
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[T]he essence of the doctrine is that, as legal rights are conferred by the
community, the latter cannot countenance their anti-social use by indi-
viduals; that the exercise of a hitherto legal right becomes unlawful when
it degenerates into an abuse of rights; and that there is such an abuse of
rights each time the general interest of the community is injuriously af-
fected as the result of the sacrifice of an important social or individual in-
terest to a less important, though hitherto legally recognized, individual
right.1 92
Do No Harm. F. V. Garcia Amador posits yet another formulation of
abuse of right, the practicality of which is highly questionable.
Amador finds:
[T]hat the State should conduct itself, even when exercising a right, in
such a manner as to do no harm to the general interest or to the particular
interests of third States.'93
* Act Honestly. Bin Cheng views abuse of right as merely an applica-
tion of the principle of good faith to the exercise of rights. Thus, an
abuse of right occurs when a nation fails to exercise its rights in
good faith."' Cheng formulates abuse of right as follows:
Where the right confers upon its owner a discretionary power, this must be
exercised honestly, sincerely, reasonably, in conformity with the spirit of
the law and with due regard to the interests of others. All rights have to be
exercised reasonably and in a manner compatible with both the contractual
obligations of the party exercising them and the general rules and princi-
ples of the legal order. They must not be exercised fictitiously so as to
evade such obligations or rules of law, or maliciously so as to injure oth-
ers.1
95
Because the concept of "good faith" is broad and largely undefined,
Cheng's formulation of abuse of right is the broadest. It can be viewed as a
conglomeration of each of the preceding rules, although it is unclear to what
extent motive or intent is required to be shown.
2. Analysis of Formulations
Scholars have fashioned international abuse of right rules as diverse as
the formulations under municipal law. The very fact that they have suggests
that the concept of abuse of right remains a policy abstraction and not a rule
to be used to judge a nation's conduct. To which of these rules must a nation
adhere? Given their foundation, is such adherence a valid expectation?
192. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
286 (2d ed. 1966).
193. Amador, supra note 162, at 381.
194. CHENG, supra note 156, at 121.
195. Id. at 136.
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Because there is so little agreement on the content of an abuse of right
principle and such a diverse basis upon which to formulate a rule, many
scholars have concluded that a rule prohibiting the abuse of right does not
exist in international law. For example, after reviewing the sources of inter-
national law with respect to abuse of right, Brownlie concludes:
[I]t may be said that the doctrine is a useful agent in the progressive de-
velopment of the law, but that, as a general principle, it does not exist in
positive law. Indeed it is doubtful if it could be safely recognized as an
ambulatory doctrine .... "
Georg Schwarzenberger and Edward D. Brown find:
In view of the diversity on this subject in the municipal laws of civilized
countries, it would also be difficult to accept the proposition that the pro-
hibition of the abuse of rights is a general principle of law recognized by
civilized nations97
Similarly, Brian D. Smith concludes:
[T]he principles of good neighborliness and abuse of rights.., do not...
appear to have advanced from policy abstractions to concrete rules of de-
cision which limit state prerogatives with respect to the environment.98
Such scholarly conclusions seem more defensible than the claim that
there is a concrete rule of abuse of right that is capable of application in a
contested case by an international tribunal, given the variety and vagueness
of the efforts of the proponents of the rule to define it. Similarly, no interna-
tional tribunal has yet found the principle concrete enough to base any deci-
sion on it.
III. THE SHRIMP CASE AND DICTA IN OTHER DECISIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNALS AND THEIR APPLICATION TO THE JAPANESE RESEARCH
PROGRAM
Although the dicta of decisions by international tribunals have been
cited to demonstrate that an extra-treaty rule prohibiting the abuse of right
exists in international law, no international tribunal has expressly founded
liability on this concept.' 9 Because international tribunals have not had occa-
sion to apply the concept, other than as an indication of what the law would
196. BROWNLIE, supra note 166, at 446.
197. GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER & E.D. BROWN, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 85
(6th ed. 1976).
198. BRIAN D. SMTrH, STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT 85 (1988).
199. See Triggs, supra note 7, at 37 (accepting this proposition until the Shrimp Case
was decided; see infra Section Ill.B); Iluyomade, supra note 155, at 92 ("The present writer
has also not come across any decision of an international tribunal in which liability has been
expressly founded on abuse of right.").
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have been had the facts been different, "the principle has lacked legal con-
tent."2°° Notwithstanding claims that the findings of the Appellate Body of
the WTO in the Shrimp Case are evidence of the viability of the abuse of
right principle in international law, a close reading of the ruling in that mat-
ter indicates that the Appellate Body rejected reliance on such general prin-
ciples, and instead grounded its decision on the detailed wording of the rele-
vant trade agreement, language that is not present in the ICRW.
A. Dicta in Decisions of International Tribunals
Scholars have cited to dicta contained in a variety of decisions of
international tribunals and relied upon inferences that could be drawn from
such statements to fashion a rule. Still other cases are cited simply because
dicta demonstrate general support for the notion that an abuse of right rule
exists in international law, although it is not defined.
For example, in Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, the
Permanent Court of International Justice held that "Germany undoubtedly
retained until the actual transfer of sovereignty the right to dispose of her
property, and only a misuse of this right could endow an act of alienation
with the character of a breach of the Treaty."2 1 Scholars often cite to the fol-
lowing additional language:
[S]uch misuse has not taken place in the present case. The act in question
does not overstep the limits of the normal administration of public prop-
erty and was not designed to procure for one of the interested Parties an il-
licit advantage and to deprivethe other of an advantage to which he was
entitled. 2n
Thus, presumably, by inference, an abuse of right would occur if it
could be proved that a right was exercised in such a manner as to secure an
illicit advantage while depriving another of an advantage to which he was
entitled.
In the Free Zones Case, the Permanent Court of International Justice
recognized France's right to maintain its cordon and to apply its fiscal legis-
lation to the frontier zones adjoining France and Switzerland. However, the
Court added the following language which scholars often cite:
A reservation must be made as regards the case of abuses of a right, since
it is certain that France must not evade the obligations to maintain the
zones by erecting a customs barrier under the guise of a control cordon.
200. Triggs, supra note 7, at 38.
201. Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germ. v. Pol.), 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A) No. 7, at 30.
202. Id. at 37-38, cited in e.g., Triggs, supra note 7, at 37-38; Iluyomade, supra note 155,
at 61-62; LAUTERPACHT, supra note 160, at 162-63; Amador, supra note 162, at 378.
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But an abuse cannot be presumed by the Court.0 3
Thus, presumably, by inference, an abuse of right would occur if it
could be proved that a right were used for a purpose other than that for
which it were conferred in order to evade a legal obligation to the injury of
another.
Other references are too vague to infer even the semblance of a worka-
ble rule. For example, in the Rights of Nationals of the United States of
America in Morocco Case, the International Court of Justice considered the
methods used by the customs authorities in the French Zone in fixing the
valuation of imported goods for customs purposes, and suggested several
factors that the customs authorities might take into consideration in making
future decisions. The Court warned that:
The power of making the valuation rests with the Customs authorities, but
it is a power which must be exercised reasonably and in good faith.204
Still other references appear to support the notion that a rule against the
abuse of right exists or ought to exist in international law, but give little ink-
ling as to what that rule might be. For example, in the Barcelona Traction
Case, Judge Ammoun declared, "Abuse of right, like denial of justice, is an
international tort... enshrined in a general principle of law which emerges
from the legal systems of all nations."2"
Similarly, in the Corfu Channel (Merits) Case, Judge Alvarez stated:
I consider that in virtue of social interdependence, this condemnation of
the misuse of a right should be transplanted into international law. For in
that law, the unlimited exercise of a right by a state as a consequence of its
absolute sovereignty may sometimes cause disturbances or even conflicts
which are a danger to peace.2°
However, as aptly put by Iluyomade, "[iut is true enough that all of the
pronouncements were unnecessary to the determination of the issue at hand,
or were no more than guarded warnings against abusive exercise of right.
' 207
In short, as even advocates of the abuse of right principle are forced to ad-
203. Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex (Fr. v. Switz.), 1932 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A/B) No. 46, at 167, cited in e.g., Triggs, supra note 7, at 38; Iluyomade, supra note 155,
at 62; LAUTERPACHT, supra note 160, at 163; CHENG, supra note 156, at 123; Amador, supra
note 162, at 378.
204. Rights of Nationals of the U.S. in Morocco (Fr. v. U.S.), 1952 I.C.J. 176, 212 (Aug.
27), cited in, e.g., Triggs supra note 7, at 40; Iluyomade, supra note 155, at 63; CHENG, supra
note 156, at 136 n.49; LAUTERPACHT, supra note 160, at 164 n.14.
205. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 1, 324
(Feb. 5) (Ammoun, J. dissenting), cited in, e.g., Triggs, supra note 7, at 38; Iluyomade, supra
note 155, at 65; Taylor, supra note 156, at 325 n.4.
206. Corfu Channel (Merits) (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 1, 48 (April 9), cited in Iluyo-
made, supra note 155, at 63 (emphasis added).
207. lluyomade, supra note 155, at 65.
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mit, because international tribunals have not had occasion to apply the con-
cept, the principle referenced in these and other cases "has lacked legal con-
tent." ' Thus, at least until the Shrimp Case, there was little law to be
gleaned from decisions of international tribunals to apply upon invocation of
the abuse of right principle.
B. The Shrimp Case
It has been contended that the Shrimp Case fundamentally changed the
legal landscape and "strengthened"2" the principle of abuse of right because
the WTO's Appellate Body "founded liability on this concept." '0 Indeed, the
argument goes, the Shrimp Case provides the necessary legal context for a
challenge to Japan's research program. This is to load onto the decision of
the WTO Appellate Body more weight than it can bear.
Under review in this WTO dispute was a U.S. law (Section 609(b) of
Pub. L. No. 101-162211) prohibiting shrimp imports from countries failing to
adopt in their shrimp fisheries measures comparable to those in the United
States designed to protect sea turtles. 2 The imposition of embargoes under
Section 609 directly contradicted the basic principles of open trade enshrined
in the WTO agreements. The Appellate Body found 3 that the way that the
United States was implementing the law was inconsistent with the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade." 4 The Appellate Body, while mentioning
the principle of good faith as an interpretative aid,2" did not rely upon it in
reaching its conclusions. Instead, it relied upon specific evidence of a viola-
tion of explicit and objective standards contained in GATT 1994 itself. Thus,
the decision has little application to an evaluation of Japan's program of sci-
entific research under the ICRW, which lacks the specific language con-
tained in Article XX of GATT 1994.
1. Basis of the Appellate Body Decision
The Appellate Body grounded its decision almost entirely on two parts
of Article XX of GATT 1994, which describe the circumstances under
which a WTO member country can restrict trade in order to protect ex-
208. Triggs, supra note 7, at 38.
209. Id. at 41.
210. Id. at 37.
211. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1537 note (West 2001).
212. See Shrimp Case, supra note 10, 3.
213. Id. [186.
214. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral trade nego-
tiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1
(1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/06-
gatt.pdf [hereinafter GAT 1994].
215. See Shrimp Case, supra note 10, 158-60.
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haustible natural resources." 6 Article XX(g) provides for a "general excep-
tion" from the agreement's prohibitions against import restraints for meas-
ures "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption." The Appellate Body concluded that, while the
U.S. action met the standards established in Article XX(g), it failed to meet
the standards in the introductory language to Article XX, the so-called "cha-
peau" language."7 This requires that, in addition to satisfying any one of the
specific exemptions enumerated in Article XX, including Article XX(g), the
proposed measures "are not applied in a manner which would constitute a
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where
the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade."
The Appellate Body first ruled that the U.S. action was consistent with
the language in Article XX(g) authorizing certain conservation methods oth-
erwise inconsistent with the requirements of GATT 1994."8 In reaching this
conclusion, it necessarily endorsed "[t]he legitimacy of the declared policy
objective of the measure, and the relationship of that objective with the
measure itself and its general design and structure."2 '9 Specifically, it held
that the "the measure of the United States in dispute in this appeal serves an
environmental objective that is recognized as legitimate under paragraph (g)
of Article XX of the GATT 1994. ' '22
Unlike Article VIII of the ICRW, GATT Article XX also contains the
additional specific standards in the chapeau, and it was this language that the
Appellate Body relied upon in finding against the United States. The Appel-
late Body's ruling rested squarely on a detailed discussion of the ways in
which the United States engaged in "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimina-
tion" in violation of the chapeau's specific standard. This can be readily
seen by a brief summary of the basis of the Appellate Body's ruling. It ruled
that the United States violated the prohibition against unjustifiable discrimi-
nation because in implementing Section 609, the United States failed to take
into account the different conditions in the waters of different countries;1
2
because its actions were discriminatory and unjustifiable because of the way
the United States consulted with some but not other countries before unilat-
erally imposing the law's requirements;.22 because of the way that some
countries were given considerably longer to comply with the new United
States requirements than other countries;... and because the United States
216. GATT 1994, supra note 213 (incorporating by reference Article XX and the other
provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947, Oct. 30, 1947, as amended).
217. Shrimp Case, supra note 10, 186.
218. Id. I 144-45.
219. Id. 149.
220. Id. 186.
221. Id. 1 165.
222. Id. 172.
223. Id. ( 174-76.
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made a greater effort to provide certain countries with the technology re-
quired to comply with United States' requirements than others.2 The Appel-
late Body also ruled that the United States' action constituted arbitrary dis-
crimination in violation of the specific language in Article XX because of
the rigid way it implemented the law's requirements, because its process for
reviewing compliance by other countries was neither transparent nor predict-
able, and because the way the United States imposed import sanctions
against particular countries was lacking in due process.225
The Appellate Body's ruling rested squarely on the specific prohibition
against "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination" in the chapeau of Article
XX. Given the existence of this language and the Appellate Body's reliance
upon it, the ruling in the Shrimp Case provides no support for the proposi-
tion that in the absence of such treaty language an international tribunal can
rely on any principle of abuse of right in international law to hold a govern-
ment's action under an agreement invalid.
2. Discussion of Theories of Abuse of Right
As a preliminary matter the Appellate Body observed that the "chapeau
of Article XX is, in fact, but one expression of the principle of good faith." 26
After briefly describing the principles of good faith and abuse of right in in-
ternational law, it stated that "[a]n abusive exercise by a Member of its own
treaty right thus results in a breach of the treaty rights of the other Members
and, as well, a violation of the treaty obligation of the Member so acting. 2 7
As several other WTO cases have determined, the Appellate Body recog-
nized that the chapeau language in Article XX was adopted to prevent the
abuse of the exceptions in Article XX.
28
Immediately after referring to the general principle of abuse of right, it
quickly emphasized that, "[h]aving said this, our task here is to interpret the
language of the chapeau, seeking additional interpretative guidance, as ap-
propriate, from the general principles of international law." '29 In support of
this statement, it cited Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties.2 Thus, the Appellate Body decision is explicit that the principle of
abuse of right is only an aid in interpreting the governing language in GATT
1994, rather than as a separate and independent ground for holding the U.S.
actions in violation of international law.
224. Id.
225. Id. %( 180-84.
226. Id. 158.
227. Id.
228. See, e.g., United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
Report of the Appellate Body, W.T.O. Doc. WT/DS2/AB/R, at 22 (Apr. 29, 1996),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/gasoline.wp5. see also GATT, ANALYTICAL
INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE 519-20 (6th ed. 1994).
229. Shrimp Case, supra note 10, 158.
230. Id. 1 158 n.157.
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In the discussion that followed, the Appellate Body also made it clear
that it was not relying on any principle of abuse of right as an independent
basis of its decision. While finding against the United States, the Appellate
Body noted that the United States was acting in good faith to protect endan-
gered sea turtles. It found that none of the parties challenging the United
States measures questioned the "genuineness of the commitment" of the
United States to the policy of protecting and conserving endangered sea tur-
tles."' It found that the measure "serves an environmental objective that is
recognized as legitimate under paragraph (g) of Article XX of the GATT
1994." '232 Thus, the Appellate Body decision was not based on any finding
that the United States had acted in bad faith by adopting a trade-restrictive
measure for ostensibly conservation reasons, when its actual motive was
commercial or some other reason not recognized by the exemption in Article
XX(g). A subsequent ruling by another WTO panel reviewing U.S. compli-
ance with the Appellate Body's decision formally held that the U.S. import
ban was motivated by conservation, rather than some impermissible com-
mercial considerations. 233
The Appellate Body in the Shrimp Case actually criticized the decision
of the initial WTO dispute settlement panel in the same case for relying on a
broad reading of the purpose of Article XX and GATT 1994, rather than
grounding its findings on the actual standards in Article XX. The initial
panel found that upholding U.S. implementation of its measure would "un-
dermine the WTO multilateral trading system. '21 In the initial panel's view,
it was necessary to determine "not only whether the measure on its own un-
dermines the WTO multilateral trading system, but also whether such type of
measure, if it were to be adopted by other Members; would threaten the se-
curity and predictability of the multilateral trading system. '235 The panel con-
cluded that the U.S. rules did threaten the multilateral trading system since,
231. Id. 135.
232. Id. 186.
233. Following U.S. changes to its guidelines in response to the Appellate Body ruling,
Malaysia complained that the United States was still not in compliance with Article XX and
the Appellate Body decision. Malaysia formally requested referral of the matter to a dispute
settlement panel in October 2000. The panel considering Malaysia's concerns determined that
implementation of the U.S. import ban on certain shrimp, as modified by it following the rul-
ing of the Appellate Body, was consistent with WTO rules and the Appellate Body's decision.
In the course of reviewing U.S. compliance with the requirements of WTO rules, as expli-
cated in the Appellate Body's decision, the panel specifically held that the U.S. ban was not a
disguised restriction on trade in violation of the chapeau language in Article XX. United
States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5
by Malaysia, Report of the Panel, W.T.O. Doc. WT/DS58/RW, 5.143 (Jun. 15, 2001),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-je/dispu-e/58rw-e.pdf [hereinafter Shrimp Ar-
ticle 21.5 Panel]. Subsequently, the Appellate Body upheld the panel ruling. See infra note
251.
234. United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report
of the Panel, W.T.O. Doc. WT/DS58/R, at 291 (May 15, 1998), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-.e/dispu_e/58rOl.pdf [hereinafter Shrimp Panel].
235. Id. (emphasis in original).
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since, if the United States could adopt such trading restrictions, other coun-
tries could as well, leading to a multitude of different and at times conflict-
ing requirements that would restrict trade. In that event, "the WTO Agree-
ment could no longer serve as a multilateral framework for trade among
Members as security and predictability of trade relations under those agree-
ments would be threatened. 236
In justifying its broad reading of the chapeau language, the initial panel
explained that it was invoking the principle that "international agreements
must be applied in good faith, in light of the pacta sunt servanda princi-
ple." '237 It cited both Article 2623' and Article 18239 of the Vienna Conven-
tion."l Article 26 states, "Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to
it and must be performed by them in good faith." Article 18 states, "A State
is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of
a treaty." The ruling of the initial WTO panel concluded that Article 18 ex-
presses a "generally applicable principle," even though the specific provision
only applies to the period between a State's expression of intent to be bound
by a treaty, and the entry into force of the treaty.""
The Appellate Body found that the initial panel's expansive reading of
the chapeau language in light of the broad objective and purpose of GATT
1994 was legally incorrect and a misreading of Article XX. It did not cite the
pacta sunt servanda principle in its own discussion of the relevance of the
principles of abuse of right. It emphasized that the initial panel's approach to
interpreting Article XX was inconsistent with the "customary rules of inter-
pretation of public international law," which all panels and the Appellate
Body must follow pursuant to the specific requirements of the WTO rules.242
In language that is equally applicable to any effort to apply any vague no-
tions of abuse of right to Japan's actions under Article VIII of the ICRW, the
Appellate Body rebuked the initial panel and its reasoning as follows:
A treaty interpreter must begin with, and focus upon, the text of the par-
ticular provision to be interpreted. It is in the words constituting that provi-
sion, read in their context, that the object and purpose of the states parties to
the treaty must first be sought. Where the meaning imparted by the text itself
is equivocal or inconclusive, or where confirmation of the correctness of the
reading of the text itself is desired, light from the object and purpose of the
treaty as a whole may usefully be sought.
In the present case, the Panel did not expressly examine the ordinary
meaning of the words of Article XX11
3
236. Id. at 292.
237. Id. at 290.
238. Id. at 290 n.644.
239. Id. at 290.
240. Vienna Convention, supra note 61, arts. 26, 18.
241. Shrimp Panel, supra note 234, at 290-91, 290 nn. 644-45.
242. Shrimp Case, supra note 110, 1 114.
243. Id. [ 114-15.
42
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 32, No. 2 [2002], Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol32/iss2/2
2002] JAPAN'S WHALE RESEARCH PROGRAM AND INT'L LAW 193
Other Appellate Body rulings have made similar points. In a ruling par-
ticularly relevant to any question about the relationship of Article VIII of the
ICRW to the remainder of the Convention, the Appellate Body in the Beef
Hormone Case warned about the danger of redoing the balance struck be-
tween the parties in another of the WTO agreements as follows:
The standard of review appropriately applicable in proceedings [sc., un-
der the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Meas-
ures], of course, must reflect the balance established in that Agreement be-
tween the jurisdictional competences conceded by the Members to the WTO
and the jurisdictional competences retained by the Members for themselves.
To adopt a standard of review not clearly rooted in the text of the SPS
Agreement itself, may well amount to changing that finely drawn balance;
and neither a panel nor the Appellate Body is authorized to do that.2"
The decision of the Appellate Body in the Shrimp Case thus rejects
creative uses of the abuse of right principle to rule against a country invok-
ing its rights under a treaty. Such a finding has broad applicability beyond
WTO jurisprudence because in making its decisions the WTO Appellate
Body and initial panels are charged with responsibility "to clarify" the provi-
sions of the WTO agreements "in accordance with customary rules of inter-
pretation of public international law.""5 The Appellate Body's ruling thus
argues strongly against any argument that Japan may not continue its scien-
tific research program because the program somehow undermines the pur-
poses and intent of the ICRW.2'"
Nor is the Shrimp Case authority for the proposition that a country may
not exercise its rights under an agreement unless it first achieves the agree-
ment of other members. It has been suggested that the Appellate Body
placed weight on the fact that "the US had failed to seek consensus through
consultations" with the countries in Asia that were challenging the U.S. im-
port ban. 7 The conclusion, so the argument goes, is that "[a] unilateral im-
position of a ban in Asia was, the Appellate Body concluded, discriminatory
and arbitrary." ' 8 The Appellate Body did indicate that the United States vio-
lated the specific prohibition in the chapeau against discriminatory action
244. European Community-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hor-
mones), Report of the Appellate Body, W.T.O. Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R, 115 (Jan. 16, 1998),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop.e/dispu-e/hormab.pdf. See also Japan-Taxes
on Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, W.T.O. Doc. WT/DS8/AB/R, at 12
(Oct. 4, 1996), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/alcohpr.wp5 ("Arti-
cle 31 of the Vienna Convention provides that the words of the treaty form the foundation for
the interpretive process: 'interpretation must be based above all upon the text of the treaty."').
245. Article 3.2 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes (Annex 2 to Agreement Establishing World Trade Organization), Apr. 14, 1994,
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_elegal-e/28-dsu.pdf.
246. It is the case in any event that Japan's program is fully consistent with the purposes
of the ICRW. See supra Section I.
247. Triggs, supra note 7, at 42.
248. Id.
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when it "negotiated [an international conservation agreement] seriously with
some, but not with other Members (including the appellees) that export
shrimp to the United States."249
The decision does not mean, however, that the some general principle of
abuse of right required the United States to reach consensus with all affected
parties before imposing its trade restrictions. Nothing in Article XX of
GATT 1994 in fact prohibits unilateral action so long as a party implements
such measures in a way that complies with the specific requirements in Arti-
cle XX. If Article XX required consensus before a party acted, the Article
would be superfluous. The subsequent WTO panel reviewing U.S. compli-
ance with the Appellate Body decision ruled that the Appellate Body's deci-
sion only required the U.S. to make "serious good faith efforts" over a pe-
riod of time to negotiate a multilateral conservation agreement with
interested Indian Ocean states.25 The panel ruled that the U.S. had demon-
strated that it had made such "serious good faith efforts," and that this was
sufficient to comply with the requirements of Article XX. The U.S. was not
required to reach agreement with all other interested members before impos-
ing any import restrictions consistent with the WTO trade rules." 1 This find-
ing was subsequently upheld by the Appellate Body of the WTO which re-
viewed the June 15, 2001 panel report at the request of Malaysia.252
By the same token, nothing in the ICRW, including Article VIII, re-
quires Japan to obtain agreement from all the other parties to the agreement
before acting under it. To the contrary, as noted in Section I.A., supra, no
such obligation can be read into the Convention or the rules and procedures
of the IWC Scientific Committee. And nothing in the Shrimp Case suggests
that a tribunal is free to read such requirement for consensus into an agree-
ment when none is expressly provided.
In summary, the Shrimp Case rests on the specific language of Article
XX of GATT 1994, even though in interpreting the requirements of that lan-
guage the WTO decisions may refer to general principles of good faith. The
Shrimp Case does not rest on any independent principle of abuse of right. It
is therefore inapplicable to any review of Japan's conduct under Article VIII
249. Shrimp Case, supra note 10, 172.
250. Shrimp Article 21.5 Panel, supra note 234, IN 5.60, 5.63, 5.76. The panel relied
upon general principles of good faith to conclude that the U.S. obligation to make a serious
effort to negotiate a multilateral agreement implied an obligation to continue to make such
efforts over a sustained period of time. In doing so, the panel was using the principle of good
faith to interpret Article XX, not as an independent source of a separate legal obligation of the
U.S.
251. Id. J9 5.67, 5.87.
252. United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Re-
course to Article 21.5 by Malaysia, Report of the Appellate Body, W.T.O. Doc.
WT/DS58/AB/RW, 1 134 (Oct. 22, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/ tra-
top_e/dispu e/58abrwe.pdf. The Appellate Body Report also upheld all other major findings
of the panel.
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of the ICRW because Article VIII contains no comparable language to that
found in the chapeau of Article XX of GATT 1994.
Apart from the very different language at issue in Article XX of GATT
1994 and the ICRW, the factual nature of the disputes is also very different.
Indeed, the Shrimp Case noted that "a balance must be struck between the
right of a member to invoke an exception under Article XX and the duty of
that same Member to respect the treaty rights of other Members."'2 3 The very
nature of such a balancing requires an evaluation of the extent to which an
action by one member undermines the rights of the other members. The Ap-
pellate Body held the United States to a high standard because, as it noted,
the United States was seeking "to use an economic embargo to require other
Members to adopt essentially the same comprehensive regulatory program,
to achieve a certain policy goal, as that in force within that Member's terri-
tory, without taking into consideration different conditions which may occur
in the territories of those other Members. '2
The circumstances of the Japanese scientific research program require
balancing a very different set of rights and obligations. When Japan engages
in its research it does not directly interfere with the activities of other parties
to the ICRW. Japan, by engaging in such activities, is not forcing other
countries to engage in the same research activities, as the United States in
fact was forcing other countries to follow its own turtle conservation policies
in the Shrimp Case. The Japanese program, moreover, does not discriminate
against some IWC member countries to the advantage of others. Japan has
kept all members of the IWC fully informed in advance of the nature and ex-
tent of its research activities. Unlike the United States in the Shrimp Case,
Japan has engaged in extensive consultations with the Scientific Committee
of the IWC throughout the history of its program. Thus, even if the Shrimp
Case were precedent for deciding the validity of Japan's conduct under the
ICRW on the basis of the principle of abuse of right-and as discussed it is
not-the factual differences between the two controversies would eliminate
in any event the precedential value of the Shrimp Case.
IV. JAPAN'S RESEARCH PROGRAM AND THE SOUTHERN BLUEFIN TUNA CASE
A final source of international law is found in treaties and international
agreements. It has been argued that UNCLOS, as invoked in the recent dis-
pute between Australia and New Zealand on the one hand, and Japan on the
other, over southern bluefin tuna (the "Southern Bluefin Tuna Case"), pro-
vides further evidence of the existence of the principle of abuse of right in
positive law, and further authority for holding Japan's research program in
violation of international law. In the Southern Bluefin Tuna Case, Australia
and New Zealand questioned the scientific validity of a Japanese experimen-
253. Shrimp Case, supra note 10, 156.
254. Id. 1 164.
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tal fishing program. When the three countries failed to resolve the matter to
their satisfaction under the regional fishery agreement known as the Conven-
tion for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna,255 Australia and New
Zealand initiated an action before ITLOS, charging Japan with violations of
UNCLOS. In a decision announced August 27, 1999, ITLOS required Japan
to cease its experimental fishing program, until an arbitration panel con-
vened under the procedures of UNCLOS had an opportunity to decide on the
merits whether Japan's actions violated UNCLOSY
Such an Arbitral Tribunal was organized pursuant to Part XV of
UNCLOS. After hearing extensive arguments from all three governments, it
ruled August 4, 2000, by a 4 to 1 vote, that it had no jurisdiction over the
dispute."7 It pointed out that the issues in controversy arose under both the
CCSBT and UNCLOS, and the parties had agreed in the CCSBT on various
ways to resolve any dispute that arose under that agreement."M The CCSBT
did not give one party the right to unilaterally invoke compulsory arbitration.
The Arbitral Tribunal concluded that the CCSBT precluded the right of one
CCSBT party to initiate compulsory arbitration against another CCSBT
party under UNCLOS 9 Accordingly, the Arbitral Tribunal revoked the
provisional orders adopted by ITLOS and dismissed the matter.2" Quite apart
from the fact that the Tribunal decision rendered the ITLOS determination
moot, neither the arguments nor result in the Southern Bluefin Tuna Case
suggest that Japan is conducting its activities in violation of its obligations
under UNCLOS.
A. Role of Abuse of Right Principle
The Southern Bluefin Tuna Case illustrates the insubstantiality of any
theory that the principle of abuse of right provides meaningful grounds for
finding a country in violation of its treaty obligations. Unlike the ICRW,
UNCLOS contains a specific provision referring to the obligations of the
parties to UNCLOS to comply with the agreement in good faith and to exer-
cise their rights in a manner that does not constitute an abuse of right. Article
300 states, "States parties shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed
under the Convention and shall exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms
255. Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, May 10, 1993, 1819
U.N.T.S. 360 (entered into force May .10, 1994) [hereinafter CCSBT].
256. Southern Bluefin Tuna Case, supra note 11.
257. Southern Bluefin Tuna Case, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Austi. and
N.Z. v. Japan), 65 (Aug. 4, 2000), at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/bluefintuna/
award080400.pdf [hereinafter Southern Bluefin Tuna (Arbitration)].
258. Id. 1 54.
259. Id. 1 59. Article 281 of UNCLOS precludes a Member State from invoking the
Convention's compulsory arbitration procedures if the parties to the dispute have excluded
resort to such procedures. UNCLOS, supra note 158, art. 28. The Arbitral Tribunal inter-
preted Article 16 of the CCSBT as excluding resort to compulsory arbitration.
260. Southern Bluefin Tuna (Arbitration), supra note 257, 66.
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recognized in this Convention in a manner which would not constitute an
abuse of right.
26'
The authoritative Virginia Commentary discussion of Article 300 does
not provide significant guidance as to the substantive content, if any, of the
abuse of right principle.262 The mere reference to abuse of right without fur-
ther specificity or interpretation by international tribunals adds little weight
or content to the principle or its applicability. Even Iluyomade, a supporter
of the notion that such a rule exists, recognized that while "[t]he provisions
of certain treaties exhibit particular applications of the principle," the inclu-
sion of such provisions only provide "some circumstantial evidence of the
acceptability of the doctrine in international law. 263
The experience with Article 300 to date suggests that it is unlikely to
have much practical meaning or effect. Despite the explicit language of the
provision, neither Australia nor New Zealand invoked it as the basis of an
independent cause of action in the Southern Bluefin Tuna Case. Instead they
cited the provision only as a useful guide in interpreting Japan's duty under
other UNCLOS provisions. In the proceeding before ITLOS Australia and
New Zealand alleged that Japan was "in breach of its obligations under in-
ternational law, specifically articles 64 and 116-119 of UNCLOS, and in re-
lation thereto Article 300 and the precautionary principle which, under inter-
national law, must direct any party in the application of those articles.
''2M
When ITLOS issued its decision, neither the order nor the variety of separate
opinions issued by individual ITLOS judges cited Article 300, or in any way
relied on allegations of abuse of right to justify the provisional relief granted.
When the controversy moved to the Arbitral Tribunal, Australia and
New Zealand renewed their charges of lack of good faith, again citing Arti-
cle 300 on several occasions. Their submissions, for example, alleged that
Japan was in violation of various substantive provisions of UNCLOS gov-
erning highly migratory species (Articles 64 and 116-119), "and in relation
thereto Article 300 of UNCLOS and the precautionary principle." 65 Subse-
261. UNCLOS, supra note 158, art. 300.
262. 5 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY
149-52 (Shabtai Rosenne & Loius B. Sohn, eds., Myron H. Nordquist ed.-in-chief., 1985)
[hereinafter Virginia Commentary]. In its view, the reference to "good faith" in article 300
reflects Article 2, paragraph 2, of the U.N. Charter and the fundamental rule Pacta sunt ser-
vanda. Article 26 of the Vienna Conventions of 1969 and 1986 formulate this rule in relation
to a treaty in lapidary form: "Every treaty in force is binding on the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith." Id. at 152. In seeking to explain the reference to "abuse of
right," the Virginia Commentary refers to standard treatises discussing the concept. Id. The
Virginia Commentary concludes that the abuse of right by one member of UNCLOS must be
to the disadvantage of another member. Id.
263. Iluyomade, supra note 155, at 71.
264. Australia's Request for Provisional Measures in the Dispute Concerning Southern
Bluefin Tuna, 25 (filed July 30, 1999).
265. Australia's Statement of Claim and Grounds on Which It Is Based in the Dispute
Concerning Bluefin Tuna, 'M 37, 45 (filed July 15, 1999), at http://www.worldbank.org/ ic-
sid/bluefintuna/SBT-Statement-Claim.PDF.
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quently, the submissions argued that these obligations in Articles 64 and
116-119 "are obligations which Japan is required by Article 300 of
UNCLOS to fulfill in good faith."2 Australia argued "A State party to a re-
gional treaty which deliberately prevents the object and purpose of that
treaty from being achieved through repeated unilateral action and the threat
of unilateral action, can be called to account for this failure through the
mechanisms that UNCLOS provides."267
These allegations, in the circumstances of a treaty that specifically refers
to the abuse of right principle, would seem to provide an ideal situation for
the parties to invoke that principle as a separate legal basis for their claims.
However, in reality both Australia and New Zealand specifically ruled out
any suggestion that they were relying on Article 300 as independent legal
grounds for their complaint. In their reply brief the parties indicated that they
were not "accus[ing] Japan of some independent breach of an obligation to
act in good faith."268 At the oral hearing, New Zealand's counsel repeated
this position, suggesting only that Article 300 is "relevant to the interpreta-
tion and application of the substantive articles at the center of the dispute." 69
Thus, even in the face of a specific provision in an agreement specifically
referencing the principle of abuse of right, Australia and New Zealand chose
to rely upon the principle only as a tool in interpreting the meaning of the
obligations of Japan under other specific provisions of UNCLOS.
The decision of Australia and New Zealand not to allege an independent
breach of Article 300 indicates the extreme difficulties any country faces
should it invoke the concept as an independent cause of action. This reluc-
tance in part undoubtedly reflects a healthy awareness of the diplomatic cost
one State may pay in making such allegations against another State. As a le-
gal matter, it reflects awareness of the difficulty of proving that a State is
guilty of such a substantive breach of the abuse of right principle. Dicta by
Judge Schwebel in the Arbitral Tribunal's award in the Southern Bluefin
Tuna Case suggest that the burden of proof on a country making such allega-
tions is very high. He noted that the Tribunal's dismissal of the case for lack
of jurisdiction "does not exclude the possibility that there might be instances
in which the conduct of a State Party to UNCLOS and to a fisheries treaty
implementing it would be so egregious, and risk consequences of such grav-
ity, that a Tribunal might find that the obligations of UNCLOS provide a ba-
sis for jurisdiction, having particular regard to the provisions of Article 300




268. Reply on Jurisdiction of Australia and New Zealand, 182 (filed Mar. 31, 2000), at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsidbluefintuna/replyonjurisdictionofANZ.PDF.
269. First Round Presentation of Australia and New Zealand, vol. II, at 170 (May 8,
2000), at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/bluefintuna/0508icsi.pdf.
270. Southern Bluefin Tuna (Arbitration), supra note 247, 1 64.
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B. Applicability of UNCLOS to Japan's Research Program
It has been argued that the more specific provisions in UNCLOS appli-
cable to whaling on the high seas are enough to require Japan to halt its sci-
entific research program.7 This would only be the case if critics of Japan's
practices can demonstrate that, apart from any requirement in ICRW, Japan
has independently violated one of these UNCLOS provisions. In fact, Ja-
pan's research activities are fully consistent with all relevant obligations un-
der UNCLOS, which anticipates both the harvesting of whales and the scien-
tific study of them.272
Article 64 directs, in the case of cetaceans and other highly migratory
species, that coastal states and other States "shall co-operate directly or
through appropriate international organizations with a view to ensuring con-
servation and promoting the objective of optimum utilization of such species
throughout the region, both within and beyond the exclusive economic
zone."" ' Article 65 of UNCLOS provides, "States shall cooperate with a
view to the conservation of marine mammals and in the case of cetaceans
shall in particular work through the appropriate international organizations
for their conservation, management and study." 7 It also provides that the
relatively general provisions in UNCLOS do not preclude an international
organization such as the IWC from acting "to prohibit, limit or regulate the
exploitation of marine mammals more strictly than provided for in this
Part." '275 Article 120 provides that Article 65 applies to activities on the high
seas as well as in a country's Exclusive Economic Zone. 76
Article 116 of UNCLOS reiterates the right of any country to harvest
whales on the high seas, subject to its treaty obligations, the rights of coastal
states specified in articles 63-67, and further subject to Articles 117-120. Ar-
ticle 117 imposes on all members "the duty to take, or to cooperate with
other States in taking, such measures for their respective nationals as may be
necessary for the conservation of the living resources of the high seas." '77 Ar-
ticle 118 directs all member States to "cooperate with each other in the con-
servation and management of living resources in the areas of the high seas."
278 Article 119 directs States in determining allowable catch and other con-
servation measures to follow certain principles such as relying on the best
scientific evidence available, and adopting catch levels to produce the
271. Triggs, supra note 7, at 46.
272. In reaching this conclusion, the authors do not intend to imply any conclusion as to
whether an Arbitral Tribunal convened under Part XV of UNCLOS would have jurisdiction to
decide a challenge to Japan's scientific research program. That, and related procedural issues,
lie beyond the scope of this article.
273. UNCLOS, supra note 158, art. 64.
274. Id. art. 65.
275. Id.
276. Id. art. 120.
277. Id. art. 117.
278. Id. art. 118.
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maximum sustainable yield, while maintaining or restoring populations of
associated species." 9 It does not establish any standards, however, to govern
the conduct of a scientific research program.
None of these UNCLOS provisions prohibits Japan's whale research
program. Instead, they emphasize the importance of the continuation of such
scientific programs. The language in Articles 64 and 65 lay upon all inter-
ested parties the obligation to work through the JWC to study as well as to
conserve and manage whale stocks, with a view of promoting their optimum
utilization."' This obligation is reinforced by Article 119, which directs that
treaty parties shall take conservation measures that are designed on the basis
of the "best scientific evidence available."28' Failure to study whales through
such programs as Japan's would result in the IWC taking action in an at-
mosphere devoid of the "best scientific evidence available." Articles 64, 65,
117 and 118 of UNCLOS direct States "to co-operate" on conservation and
management matters. However, the duty to cooperate in these Articles does
not mean that Japan must accede to the particular views on conservation of
other members. The language of the provisions imposes no such obligation.
Article 117 requires all treaty parties to take, or in the alternative to co-
operate with other States in taking, measures necessary to conserve whales
as a living resource of the high seas.282 For other UNCLOS States to demon-
strate that Japan is acting in violation of this Article, they would have to
demonstrate that it is necessary for Japan to cease its scientific research pro-
gram in order to conserve the whaling stocks. To prevail on this point, other
States would have to demonstrate that Japan's scientific research activities
are endangering the whale stocks. There is no evidence based on the number
of whales taken, and the status of the stocks, that this is the case.
Finally, there is nothing in the UNCLOS provisions that bars on aes-
thetic, cultural or ethical considerations the ability of Japan or any other
State to engage in the lethal taking of whales on the high seas. If anything,
the Articles suggests that, consistent with the purposes of the ICRW dis-
cussed above, the goal of UNCLOS is to make possible the continued har-
vest of whales along with other marine resources on the high seas.283
279. Id. art. 119.
280. id. arts. 64-65.
281. Id. art. 119.
282. Id. art. 117.
283. In addition to the reference in Article 64 to the "optimum utilization" of highly mi-
gratory species, and in Article 65 to the obligation of States to cooperate for the "conserva-
tion, management and study" of cetaceans, Article 119 speaks more generically about the goal




California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 32, No. 2 [2002], Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol32/iss2/2
2002] JAPAN'S WHALE RESEARCH PROGRAM AND INT'L LAW 201
C. The ITLOS Order and the Precautionary Principle
Although Japan would not appear to violate any of the specific provi-
sions in UNCLOS, it has still been contended that the ITLOS decision in the
Southern Bluefin Tuna Case establishes a precedent requiring Japan to fol-
low the "precautionary" approach in assessing the risks of its research activi-
ties. 8' This argument apparently rests on the fact that the ITLOS order stated
that in the future the parties to the Southern Bluefin Tuna Case should "in
the circumstances act with prudence and caution to ensure that effective con-
servation measures are taken to prevent serious harm to the stock of southern
bluefin tuna."2 5
As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that whether or not
UNCLOS adopts the precautionary principle, this has little to do with
whether the ITLOS decision applied an abuse of right principle in ordering
provisional relief. A State may violate certain provisions of an agreement,
including any precautionary principle that may exist, without doing so in bad
faith. It must also be noted that the ICRW was adopted prior to the elabora-
tion of the precautionary principle, and there is nothing in the text of the
ICRW that would suggest the applicability of any such principle in interpret-
ing that agreement. Consequently, the precautionary principle is inapplicable
to any discussion of Japan's obligation under the ICRW. At the most, any
allegation that Japan has failed to show the proper caution or prudence only
goes to a possible violation of the substantive provisions of UNCLOS.
In any event, the ITLOS decision in the Southern Bluefin Tuna Case
does not provide persuasive authority for finding that the conduct of all
UNCLOS member States must be assessed pursuant to the precautionary
principle. In the first place, the ITLOS order did not endorse the precaution-
ary principle or approach, or indicate that its action was based on this theory.
In fact, the language of the order as drafted by ITLOS stands in stark con-
trast to the corresponding language requested by Australia and New Zealand.
In their submissions, the two countries requested an order requiring all par-
ties to "act consistently with the precautionary principle in fishing for SBT
pending a final settlement of the dispute.""2 6 ITLOS chose to ignore this pro-
posed language, and instead to adopt the general "prudence and caution"
language without the suggested reference to the precautionary principle.287
Standing on its own as a part of the remedial order ITLOS granted, an ad-
monition to the parties to exercise in the future prudence and caution is nei-
ther very clear in its meaning nor remarkable. While referring to the future
284. Triggs, supra note 7, at 45. It is not evident from Professor Triggs' discussion what
the difference is between the precautionary principle and the precautionary approach, al-
though it appears generally that in her view the precautionary approach implies a less rigid or
doctrinaire standard.
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conduct of the parties, it does not suggest that ITLOS relied upon any varia-
tion of the precautionary principle in deciding that the past conduct of Japan
violated the requirements of UNCLOS. Indeed, "[i]t is not easy to recognize
the orders of the ITLOS as the application of either a principle or an ap-
proach."28
Second, even if ITLOS had endorsed the precautionary principle or ap-
proach in its order, this would have had little relevance to whether UNCLOS
includes such a principle as part of its substantive standards. Under
UNCLOS, ITLOS is required to grant such provisional relief "if it considers
that prima facie the tribunal which is to be constituted would have jurisdic-
tion and that the urgency of the situation so requires." '289 ITLOS was not
asked to rule on the merits of the case, and so whatever it said about the the-
ory was in the context of deciding whether to grant provisional relief. At the
most, all ITLOS decided was that at the preliminary stage of the proceeding
it should err on the side of caution, and order a halt to Japan's experimental
fishing program, pending the Arbitral Tribunal's consideration of the case.
Without regard to the precautionary principle or approach, under such a di-
rective ITLOS must necessarily err on the side of preserving the status quo.
A few of the separate opinions of individual ITLOS members express
varying degrees of support for the precautionary principle. At the same time,
however, they express questions about the practicality and applicability of
the precautionary principle, while recognizing that the ITLOS order does not
adopt either the precautionary principle or approach. Judge Laing, for exam-
ple, concluded that he personally favors the precautionary principle, but
noted "it is not possible, on the basis of the materials available and argu-
ments presented on this application for provisional measures, to determine
whether, as the Applicants contend, customary international law recognizes
a precautionary principle.""9 Similarly, Judge Shearer in his separate opinion
expressed support for the approach, but recognized that "whether that [pre-
cautionary] principle can of itself be a mandate for action, or provide defini-
tive answers to all questions of environmental policy, must be doubted."29'
Judge Treves noted, "I fully understand the reluctance of the Tribunal in tak-
ing a position as to whether the precautionary approach is a binding principle
of customary international law. Other courts and tribunals, recently con-
fronted with this question, have avoided to give an answer.
' 292
288. Triggs, supra note 7, at 44.
289. Southern Bluefin Tuna Case, supra note 11, 39 (citing UNCLOS art. 290, 5).
290. Southern Bluefin Tuna Case (N.Z. v. Japan; Austl. v. Japan), 1999 ITLOS Nos. 3 &
4 (Provisional Measures Order of Aug. 27) (separate opinion of Judge Lang, 16), at
http://www.un.orgfDepts/los/ITLOS/3Laing.htm.
291. Southern Bluefin Tuna Case (N.Z. v. Japan; Austl. v. Japan), 1999 ITLOS Nos. 3 &
4 (Provisional Measures Order of Aug. 27) (Separate Opinion of Judge Shearer), at
http://www.un.org/DeptsIlos/ITLOS/3Shearer.htm.
292. Southern Bluefin Tuna Case (N.Z. v. Japan; Austl. v. Japan), 1999 ITLOS Nos. 3 &
4 (Provisional Measures Order of Aug. 27) (Separate Opinion by Judge Treves, T 9), at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/ITLOS/3Treves.htm.
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Finally, leaving aside these legal points, the factual situation confronting
ITLOS in the Southern Bluefin Tuna Case has little relevance to Japan's
whale research program. What was at issue in the Southern Bluefin Tuna
Case was a program that by its terms involved commercial fishing. Even
then, none of the parties to the controversy advocated a complete ban on
harvesting the fish, only that fishing be conducted at sustainable levels. In
contrast, Japan is not engaging in any commercial whaling program. As dis-
cussed above, its program involves only the catching of whales for research
purposes. Further, this take is very small compared to the size of the stocks
in question. That whale meat may also be sold is only incidental to the re-
search and, in any event, is required by the terms of the ICRW itself. What-
ever the ITLOS order meant by exercising prudence and caution, none of the
parties interpreted it as requiring the complete cessation of commercial fish-
ing for southern bluefin tuna. If cessation of fishing was not required under
the standard of prudence and caution in the case of southern bluefin tuna,
then a fortiori there is no basis to conclude that a scientific research take
limited to just a few hundred whales per year and fully consistent with main-
tenance of sustainable whale populations, would be imprudent or incautious.
V. CONCLUSIONS ABOUT ABUSE OF RIGHT AND JAPAN'S WHALE RESEARCH
PROGRAM
In conclusion, the principle of abuse of right does not provide a basis for
challenging Japan's whale research program under international law. Not
only is the program consistent with the requirements of the ICRW, but the
principle itself is also too vague and ill-defined to form a predicate for an in-
ternational tribunal to rely upon it in passing on the lawfulness of Japan's
program. Despite suggestions to the contrary, no international tribunal has
decided a matter on the basis of the principle. The questions surrounding Ja-
pan's program are in the final analysis political and diplomatic in nature.
The effort to turn the controversy over the program into a juridical contest
cannot withstand scrutiny under international law in the absence of any rul-
ing of an international tribunal based on the abuse of right principle.
Even if an abuse of right was a concrete and intelligible principle on
which an international tribunal could rely, it is clear that no adequate show-
ing could be made that Japan's research program is a violation of the princi-
ple. This is evident from consideration of the burden upon a complaining
party and the application of each of the various formulations of the abuse of
right doctrine discussed above to the facts of Japan's whale research pro-
gram.
A. The Burden on the Complaining Party
In the absence of decided cases, there is necessarily some uncertainty in
determining what the burden would be on a party claiming abuse of right.
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However, scholarly discussion suggests that the burden would be heavy. In
Cheng's view, an abuse of a right occurs when a nation fails to act in good
faith.293 However, there is a presumption that a nation acts in accordance
with the law, i.e., in good faith. Judge Ecer noted in the Corfu Channel Case
that there is a
'strong[] ... presumption that States are acting in accordance with interna-
tional law.'
[I]n international law, there is a presumption in favor of every state, corre-
sponding very nearly to the presumption in favour of the innocence of
every individual in municipal law. There is a presumptio juris that a state
behaves in conformity with international law. Therefore, a state which al-
leges a violation of international law by another state must prove that this
presumption is not applicable in some special case." 4
While serving as the Assistant to the Legal Advisor at the U.S. State
Department, Sandifer described two relevant presumptions of official regu-
larity that international tribunals have applied: "the uniform presumption of
the regularity and validity of all acts of public officials" and "the legal pre-
sumption ... of the regularity and necessity of governmental acts. "295
This presumption of lawful behavior and good faith "amounts to a pre-
sumption against abuse of rights and imposes a heavy burden of proof on
any party to a dispute which attempts to prove any abuse of rights by its op-
ponent. ' ' A complaining party would at least have to shoulder the eviden-
tiary burden utilized in cases where bad faith has been claimed. This means
that a complaining party would have to demonstrate by "clear and convinc-
ing evidence" that a nation committed an abuse of right.29 Even if, as some
scholars suggest, abuse of right is something other than bad faith, e.g., that
motive is not an essential element,2 98 there is no persuasive reason for think-
ing that the standard of proof should be any lower when a complaining party
293. CHENG, supra note 156, at 121.
294. Corfu Channel (Merits) Case, 1949 I.C.J. 119 (Ecer, J., dissenting) (quoting GEORG
SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 396 (2d ed. 1945)). See also Free Zones Case,
1932 P.C.I.J., (ser. A/B) No. 46 at 167 (although the Court alluded to the concept of abuse of
rights it added "an abuse cannot be presumed by the Court"); Certain German Interests in Pol-
ish Upper Silesia (Merits), 1926 P.C.I.J., (ser. A) No.7 at 30 (a misuse of rights "cannot be
presumed, and it rests with the party who states that there has been such misuse to prove his
statement"); CHENG, supra note 156, at 136; 1 GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 449 (3d ed. 1957) [hereinafter SCHWARZENBERGER]; Iluyomade, supra note 155, at 79.
295. DURWARD V. SANDIFER, EVIDENCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 99 (1939)
(citations and footnotes omitted).
296. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 294, at 449.
297. Tacna-Arica Question (Chile v. Peru), 2 R.I.A.A. 925, 930 (1925) ("A finding of
the existence of bad faith should be supported not by disputable inferences but by clear and
convincing evidence which compels such a conclusion."). See also Iluyomade, supra note
155, at 70.
298. Compare, e.g., Taylor, supra note 156, at 331-34, with CHENG, supra note 156, at
[Vol. 32
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seeks to rebut the presumption that a State has acted in accordance with the
law, and instead has abused its rights under an international agreement.
B. Application of the Abuse of Right Principle
There are five basic formulations of the abuse of right doctrine: (1) "In-
tent to Injure;" (2) "Contrary Purpose;" (3) "Balancing of Rights;" (4) "Do
no Harm," and (5) "Act Honestly." It is difficult to see how Japan's whale
research program could fail to survive scrutiny under any of these formula-
tions.
If "intent to injure" is the standard, then, under the ILA formulation, a
complaining party must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that
Japan exercised its rights under Article VIII of the ICRW with the intent to
cause injury and the party must show that it was in fact injured.'" Such a
demonstration cannot be made. First, no one has suggested that Japan in-
tended to cause injury to any nation through the exercise of its right to con-
duct scientific studies of whales, and it is hard to imagine how such a claim
could plausibly be made.' Second, a showing of injury would be difficult, if
not impossible. To demonstrate injury, a complaining party would have to
show either that: (1) Japan's program results in the taking of so many whales
that it has been prevented from properly conducting its own scientific pro-
gram, or (2) Japan's scientific program results in the taking of so many
whales that the proper and effective conservation and management of whale
stocks cannot be achieved, impeding the orderly development of the whaling
industry as contemplated by the Convention. However, certainly Japan's
program is not interfering with any other nation's whale research, and, as we
have shown in Section I.D. above, the evidence is overwhelming that the
numbers of animals taken in the Japanese program are not such as to
threaten the sustainability of the stocks and so threaten the prospects for fu-
ture whale management. Indeed, as noted above, with respect to JARPA,
IWC Secretary Gambell observed that "[iun all reasonableness, we would
have to say that a commercial catch could be taken without endangering
[minke] whales,""3 1 while, with respect to JARPN and JARPN II, the num-
bers are so small-100 minke whales, 50 Bryde's whales and 10 sperm
whales annually-that it is highly unlikely that taking at these levels has any
significant effects on the stocks.3"
299. If we look to the formulation contained in the Mexican municipal statute, see supra
Section II.B.1, it additionally requires that the complaining party show that Japan gained no
advantage through the exercise of the right, i.e., that it had no legitimate purpose. As will be
discussed in the context of the "contrary purpose" principle, Japan's program did further le-
gitimate purposes.
300. By contrast, in the Shrimp Case, for example, the very purpose of the U.S. embargo
was to harm shrimp exporting nations with the hope that this sanction would cause them to
change their behavior.
301. Hornsby, supra note 138.
302. See supra Section I.D.; 2000 CHAIRMAN'S REPORT, supra note 113, at 41. See also
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If the "contrary purpose" standard is used, a complaining party would
have to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that Japan's exercise
of its right to conduct scientific whale research under Article VIII of the
ICRW is a sham to avoid its legal obligations. 3 Despite the loosely made
claims that Japan's program is for commercial rather than for scientific ends
and the science undertaken is of marginal significance,3°' the indicia that the
program is legitimate science are manifold. First, since its inception, the
Japanese research program has been conducted by a non-profit research
foundation, in close coordination with the IWC Scientific Committee. Sec-
ond, Japan has been assiduous in submitting both its proposals and research
results to the Committee. Third, the program has produced numerous pub-
lished and unpublished works, many of which have appeared in peer-
reviewed scientific journals.3 5 Fourth, the Japanese program has sought to
answer numerous, valid scientific questions relating, among other things, to:
(a) estimation of biological parameters (especially the natural mortality rate)
to improve management; (b) elucidation of stock structure to improve man-
agement; (c) examination of the role of whales in certain ecosystems; (d)
studying feeding ecology; and (e) examination of the effect of environmental
changes on cetaceans. Fifth, as expressly acknowledged by the IWC Scien-
tific Committee, the Japanese program has made important contributions to
the understanding of whale biology and has been relevant to management
concerns that are at the core of the IWC's mission. Specifically, with respect
to JARPA, and as found by the JARPA Workshop Report, Japanese research
has "given valuable information on recruitment, natural mortality, decline in
age at sexual maturity and reproductive parameters of minke whales."3 The
Report further found that "the information produced by JARPA has set the
stage for answering many questions about long term population changes re-
garding minke whales... [and] has already made a major contribution to
understanding of certain biological parameters."3' Similarly, with respect to
JARPN, the JARPN Workshop Report found, and the Scientific Committee
agreed, that "information obtained during JARPN had been and will con-
tinue to be... relevant to.. . [whale] management.""3 8 And, with respect to
JARPN II, even skeptical members of the Scientific Committee agreed that
"the primary objective of the proposal.., was scientific in nature."3"That
non-binding, political resolutions may have called upon Japan to refrain
2000 SC REPORT, supra note 100, at 78.
303. If we look to lluyomade's construction of the rule, it additionally requires the com-
plaining party show that it sustained injury. As discussed above, no such injury can be credi-
bly asserted.
304. See Triggs, supra note 7, at 59.
305. See JARPA Workshop Report, supra note 85, annex El.
306. 1997 SC Report, supra note 8, at 63.
307. Id. at 65.
308. 2000 SC REPORT, supra note 100, at 74.
309. IWC Scientific Permits Page, supra note 50.
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from some research activities, or that the Scientific Committee could not
reach consensus on such contentious and value-laden issues as whether the
research has been "required" for management or can be carried out without
lethal takes, in no way detracts from the fundamental scientific legitimacy of
the research effort. Sixth, and finally, the fact that the by-products of whales
taken to further Japan's scientific research are sold in its domestic market
lends no support to the argument that its program must primarily be a com-
mercial activity and, thus, a sham. As discussed above in Section I.A., Arti-
cle VIII, paragraph 2, of the Convention requires that this be done. As rec-
ognized by Dr. Ray Gambell, Secretary of the IWC, "[i]f you catch whales
for research purposes, the requirement is that they are fully utilized and the
products disposed of in a way that the government decides. In other words,
the products have to be fully utilized and Japan is doing what every other
government has done in previous years."3 '0
If "balancing of rights" is the approach taken, then, using both the for-
mulations of Friedmann and Lauterpacht together, a complaining party
would have to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the harm
caused by Japan's exercise of its right to conduct scientific whale research
outweighs its legitimate interests in conducting the research. However, as
discussed above in connection with the "intent to injure" formulation, the
case has not been and cannot be made that Japan's program either inhibits
the research programs of other nations or threatens whale populations in
such a way as to jeopardize their ultimate management under the ICRW re-
gime. Even if such harm might be hypothesized, it would have to be bal-
anced against the legitimate interest of Japan, and indeed all members of the
IWC, in conducting research pertinent to the conservation of the whale
stocks in furtherance of the purposes of the IWC. Indeed, Article VIII, para-
graph 4, of the Convention recognizes that "continuous collection and analy-
sis of biological data in connection with the operations of factory ships and
land stations are indispensable to sound and constructive management of the
whale fisheries." The Convention states that "Contracting Governments will
take all practicable measures to obtain such data. '3. Finally, the terms of the
moratorium and the SOS contemplate that research will be undertaken so
that the IWC may revisit the appropriateness of these measures and deter-
mine whether commercial whaling should be permitted to resume. The bal-
ance, if anything, thus weighs disproportionately in favor of allowing re-
search to proceed.
If "do no harm" is the standard to apply, then Amador's formulation is
practically unworkable. Depending upon how the harm is defined, it is diffi-
cult to contemplate how a right can be exercised to ensure that absolutely no
harm to another's interests results. This is so because there is almost always
310. BBC News Online Forum Interview with Dr. Ray Gambell, IWC Secretary (July 5,
2000), at http://newsvote.bbc.co.uklhi/englishltalking-point/forum/newsid_817000/817116
.stm.
311. ICRW, supra note 1, art. VIII, 2.
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some tension between one nation's actions and another nation's rights.
However, if the requisite harm is as substantial as that required to demon-
strate injury under the "intent to injure" standard discussed above, then, for
the same reasons, any claim of abuse of right would fail, first because the
Japanese program does not interfere with the research of other nations, and,
second, because it is unlikely to harm the stocks and impede the orderly de-
velopment of the whaling industry as contemplated by the ICRW.
Last of all, if the standard is "act honestly," then it is apparent that the
formulation of this standard by Cheng actually encompasses many of the
elements of the other formulations discussed above. For example, the re-
quirement that a right not be exercised maliciously so as to injure others is
embodied in the "intent to injure" formulation. Similarly, although it is un-
clear to what extent motive or intent is required to be proven under Cheng's
formulation, the requirement that a right not be exercised fictitiously to
evade its obligations is embodied in the "contrary purpose" formulation.
The requirement to exercise a right reasonably with due regard to others
could be embodied in the "balancing of rights" formulation. As to "hon-
esty" itself, it is difficult to see how a claim that Japan is proceeding dishon-
estly would differ from a claim that it is exercising its right under Article
VIII of the ICRW fictitiously or in bad faith. In any event, the presumption
of good faith would seem a virtually insuperable obstacle to overcome in this
regard. Indeed, the objective evidence is that Japan has faithfully submitted
its proposals and research results to the IWC Scientific Committee, repeat-
edly welcomed participation by international scientists in its research pro-
grams,"' produced numerous published and unpublished reports, including
reports in peer-reviewed scientific journals,"3 and, as affirmed by the Scien-
tific Committee, contributed to knowledge about and management of the
species. In the absence of any direct evidence that the program is simply a
subterfuge to keep Japan's commercial whaling industry alive, it would not
seem possible to make out a case of abuse of right under the "act honestly"
standard. As such scholars as Iluyomade and Taylor have emphasized, in re-
lations between sovereign nations any allegation of abuse of right must rest
on the objective facts, and not what the alleged subjective state of mind of a
State may be in the view of another State."'
C. Summary
It is far from clear that the abuse of right doctrine has sufficiently
evolved from a policy abstraction to a concrete rule of decision or juridical
standard that limits State prerogatives. Neither the Shrimp Case nor the
Southern Bluefin Tuna Case is an example of a decision based on such a
312. See IWC, CHAIRMAN'S REPORT OF THE 50TH ANNUAL MEETING 55 (1998).
313. See JARPA Workshop Report, supra note 85, annex El.
314. See supra Section II.B.1.
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general principle. Indeed, it is problematic whether a "general principle," ca-
pable of application in specific cases, can be drawn from the diverse formu-
lations of abuse of right rules contained in the municipal laws of civilized
nations, the dicta of international tribunals, international agreements or
scholarly comment. In any event, when the facts of Japan's whale research
program are fairly assessed in the context of the rights and obligations of the
parties to the ICRW, there is little question that Japan's program would pass
muster under any reasonable formulation of a rule against abuse of right.
59
Greenberg et al.: Japan's Whale Research Program and International Law
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2002
60
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 32, No. 2 [2002], Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol32/iss2/2
